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ARE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT 
TRIBUNALS FAIR?:  THE NEED FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ADDITIONAL 
DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
IN LIGHT OF NEW CASE LAW 
Emily D. Safko* 
 
The pervasiveness of sexual assault on college and university campuses 
and the schools’ failures to take sexual assault seriously have resulted in 
recent reforms to college campus disciplinary proceedings.  The federal 
government has largely prompted this wave of reform through Title IX, 
requiring schools to employ particular policies and procedures for 
investigating and adjudicating sexual assault as a condition of receiving 
federal funds.  Although the federal government’s mandates may be 
properly motivated, these reforms are criticized because they encourage 
schools to enact procedures that are heavily stacked against those accused 
of sexual assault.  Consequently, students alleging that they have been 
wrongfully held responsible for sexual assault violations due to flawed 
disciplinary procedures have brought lawsuits against their schools.  
Recent case law demonstrates that some schools, in an attempt to comply 
with Title IX, have employed procedures that are fundamentally unfair to 
accused students. 
This Note considers the interests involved in campus investigatory and 
adjudicatory systems through an analysis of recent cases and the 
procedural flaws that have emerged.  It further evaluates procedural 
protections that would strike a better balance between the interests of the 
accusers, the accused, and the schools.  In conclusion, this Note argues that 
in light of the recent case law, more meaningful judicial review and 
additional due process protections are necessary for accused students. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine Erica.1  She is out at a campus bar with her friends.2  She has a 
few drinks, and the next thing she remembers is being in a cab with men 
 
 1. This story is based on Erica Kinsman’s allegation that Jameis Winston raped her 
from the New York Times’s examination of the investigation. See Walt Bogdanich, A Star 
Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/16/sports/errors-in-inquiry-on-rape-allegations-
against-fsu-jameis-winston.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/G9ZZ-35HR].  Ms. Kinsman’s 
allegations were also a subject of the documentary, The Hunting Ground. THE HUNTING 
GROUND (Anchor Bay 2015). 
 2. See Bogdanich, supra note 1. 
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whom she has never met.3  She next remembers waking up in an unfamiliar 
apartment while a stranger is raping her.4  Erica reports her rape to the local 
police department, which conducts minimal investigation.5  The Office of 
the State Attorney declines to charge her rapist.6  Erica also brings a claim 
through her school’s on-campus disciplinary process.7  A month later, the 
school learns that another student had accused the same student of rape.8  
The Dean of Students emails the school’s Policy Chief indicating that no 
disciplinary proceedings will be taken against the accused student for either 
assault, in contravention of the school’s polices.9  A year later, school 
officials meet with Erica’s rapist, who refuses to answer any questions.10  
The school never interviews Erica.11  The school holds a hearing more than 
two years after the incident, during which Erica’s rapist answers only three 
questions.12  In making its determination, the school considers that Erica 
did not give verbal consent to sexual activity, which means her rapist 
violated school policy.13  Still, the hearing officer does not find the accused 
student responsible for rape.14 
Now imagine Drew.15  He is at a college dorm party drinking with 
friends.16  At the end of the party, Drew’s female friend, C.B., tells him that 
she needs a place to stay for the night.17  Drew offers that she can spend the 
night in his room and expects that she will sleep on the mat that he and his 
roommate use for overnight guests.18  Instead, Drew and C.B. spend the 
night in Drew’s bed and engage in what Drew believes is consensual sex.19 
A few months later over summer break, Heather Cowan, an Equal 
Opportunity Specialist for the school, contacts Drew and asks to speak with 
him over Skype, but does not provide a reason for the conversation.20  
 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See The Facts of The Hunting Ground, HUNTING GROUND FILM (2015), http:// 
www.thehuntinggroundfilm.com/the-facts/ [https://perma.cc/GH8L-4CKD]. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id.; see also infra Part I.A.2. 
 10. See The Facts of the Hunting Ground, supra note 6. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id.  Erica answered 156 questions. Id. 
 13. See id.; see also Full Copy of Jameis Winston Florida State Code-of-Conduct 
Hearing Decision, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Dec. 22, 2014, 8:04 AM), http:// 
www.tallahassee.com/story/sports/college/fsu/2014/12/21/jameis-winston-hearing-decision-
full-copy/20743065/ [https://perma.cc/3ZLY-HFAP]. 
 14. See The Facts of the Hunting Ground, supra note 6. 
 15. This story is based on the facts articulated by the court in Sterret v. Cowan, 85 F. 
Supp. 3d 916, 923–25 (E.D. Mich. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-1121 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 
2015), and by Emily Yoffe in an article published in Slate. See Emily Yoffe, The College 
Rape Overcorrection, SLATE:  DOUBLEX (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_probl
em_but_the_efforts.single.html [https://perma.cc/C88T-4FK5]. 
 16. See Yoffe, supra note 15. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Sterret, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 923. 
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Cowan questions Drew about his sexual encounter with C.B., which Drew 
explains was consensual.21 
Upon returning to school in the fall, the university removes Drew from 
his dorm.22  A month later, Drew receives a short document containing 
Cowan’s summary of their conversation, and Drew responds to the report 
“listing concerns about key omitted facts and information, significant due 
process violations[,] raising specific questions,” and rebutting each 
allegation made by the witnesses.23  Nevertheless, Cowan’s final report 
finds him responsible for sexual misconduct in violation of the school’s 
policies.24 
Drew meets with the administration at the university and explains that a 
“terrible mistake has been made.”25  Drew hires an attorney, who presents 
additional concerns about the university’s procedures, provides affidavits 
from Drew, and supplies additional evidence.26  Cowan does not amend her 
finding.27  The administration upholds Cowan’s determination, and Drew is 
suspended for four years—until C.B. graduates.28  Drew’s appeal is denied, 
despite his presentation of new evidence, and he also is denied the 
opportunity to testify under oath.29  The Appeals Board lessens the length 
of his suspension, but mandates that to be readmitted to the school, Drew 
must admit to sexual misconduct.30  During the course of the entire 
proceeding, the school never holds a hearing.31 
The prevalence of sexual assault32 on college campuses presents a 
problem in the United States today.33  A 2015 study for the Association of 
 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Yoffe, supra note 15. 
 23. Sterret, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 923–24. 
 24. Id. at 924. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Yoffe, supra note 15. 
 29. Sterret, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 925. 
 30. See id.; see also Yoffe, supra note 15. 
 31. Drew sued the school for violating his due process rights. See Sterret, 85 F. Supp. 3d 
at 924–29.  All claims were dismissed except one, the school appealed, and Drew eventually 
reached a rare settlement after mandatory mediation. See id.; see also Emily Yoffe, A 
Campus Rape Ruling, Reversed, SLATE:  DOUBLEX (Sept. 15, 2015, 2:01 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2015/09/drew_sterrett_and_university_of_
michigan_the_school_vacates_its_findings.html [https://perma.cc/44Q4-XBD4].  For further 
discussion of due process rights, see infra Parts I.A.1, II.B.1. 
 32. This Note uses the terms sexual assault and sexual misconduct interchangeably to 
mean forms of sexual harassment and sexual violence as defined by the Department of 
Education in its “Dear Colleague” letter. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (2011) [hereinafter DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER], http:// 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVD5-
K5R6].  The letter defines sexual violence as “physical sexual acts perpetrated against a 
person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use of 
drugs or alcohol.  An individual also may be unable to give consent due to an intellectual or 
other disability.  A number of different acts fall into the category of sexual violence, 
including rape, sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion.” Id. at 1–2. 
 33. See generally DAVID CANTOR ET AL., THE ASS’N OF AM. UNIVS., REPORT ON THE 
AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2015), 
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American Universities found that one in four female students experience 
nonconsensual sexual contact in college.34  Typically, when a victim reports 
such an incident, the college conducts an internal investigation to determine 
whether the institution should take disciplinary action against the accused 
student.  Many have argued that schools have systematically failed to hold 
students accountable for their actions.35 
These shortcomings, coupled with the prevalence of sexual misconduct 
on college campuses, provoked national debate and spurred colleges,36 
Congress, and the White House to act.37  Colleges have begun to reform 
their policies, especially in light of an April 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter 
addressed to all Title IX institutions from the Department of Education’s 
(DOE) Office for Civil Rights38 (OCR).  Over time, however, these reforms 
have drawn criticism for “overcorrecting” the problem by overlooking the 
important and legally mandated protection of the interests and rights of 
those accused of misconduct.39 
Analyzing recent cases in which courts have evaluated campus 
disciplinary proceedings, this Note ultimately agrees with this position and 
applies recent case law to newly proposed legislation to advocate for 
additional due process protections for the accused.  Part I describes the laws 
and legal principles that have shaped current campus disciplinary 
proceedings.  Part II then highlights the tension that exists between the 
interests of the accusers, the interests of the accused, and the interests of 
schools.  Part II also analyzes judicial review of the decisions of school 
disciplinary proceedings to evaluate the effectiveness of these adjudicatory 




Sexual%20Assault%20and%20Sexual%20Misconduct.pdf (finding that one in four women 
are victims of nonconsensual sexual contact in college) [https://perma.cc/BPQ5-UK9H]; see 
also CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE 
CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY:  FINAL REPORT (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf (finding that one in five women are victims of nonconsensual 
sexual contact in college) [https://perma.cc/FNE2-MBPY]. 
 34. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 33, at 23, 81.  This number represents the percentage of 
college seniors experiencing nonconsensual sexual contact involving physical force, 
incapacitation, coercion, and absence of affirmative consent since beginning college. See id.  
Similarly, past oft-cited studies have shown that one in five women and one in sixteen men 
are sexually assaulted during college and that 90 percent of these incidents are not reported. 
See NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., INFO & STATS FOR JOURNALISTS, STATISTICS ABOUT 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2015), http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc 
_factsheet_media-packet_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/92YG-
29YX]; KREBS ET AL., supra note 33, at xiii. 
 35. See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape and Wishing She Hadn’t, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/us/how-one-college-handled-a-sexual-
assault-complaint.html [https://perma.cc/H4U7-3F9M]; Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of 
Consequences for Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010), http:// 
www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault 
[https://perma.cc/D379-ALQY]. 
 36. This Note uses the term “college” to denote both colleges and universities. 
 37. See infra Part I.B–C. 
 38. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32. 
 39. See, e.g., Yoffe, supra note 15. 
2294 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
school policies do not appropriately balance the interests of the students and 
the schools and unfairly overlook the rights of the accused.  Analyzing the 
newly proposed campus sexual assault legislation within the context of the 
recent reversals of college disciplinary decisions, this part then argues for 
more meaningful judicial review and eventual procedural reform. 
I.  SEXUAL ASSAULT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES:  
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE SHAPING COLLEGE 
INVESTIGATORY AND ADJUDICATORY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
Disciplinary proceedings on college campuses today are largely shaped 
by the protections afforded to students under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution and Title IX’s procedural requirements regarding the 
investigation and adjudication of sexual assault on college campuses.40  Part 
I.A provides an overview of the procedural due process rights of students in 
public colleges, as well as the policies and procedures that all federally 
funded schools must employ under Title IX.  Part I.B outlines recent 
legislation with respect to sexual assault on college campuses.  Part I.C then 
describes three newly proposed bills that would add protection for both 
accusers and the accused. 
A.  The Foundation of School Sexual Assault Proceedings 
Although sexual assault can be adjudicated through criminal prosecution, 
schools investigate and adjudicate allegations of sexual assault internally 
through separate, independent systems.41  Title IX requires schools to take 
“immediate and effective steps to end sexual harassment and sexual 
violence.”42  As such, schools have adjudicatory systems in place for 
determining whether they should take disciplinary action against a student 
for violating its sexual assault policies.43  These policies exist to protect 
students from sexual violence and to ensure that schools fairly and 
 
 40. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012); DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32. 
 41. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDANCE:  HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD 
PARTIES 2–3 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 OCR GUIDANCE], http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC6P-WQQP]; see also DEAR COLLEAGUE 
LETTER, supra note 32, at 4.  Some commentators argue that sexual assault that occurs on a 
college campus, particularly nonconsensual sex offenses, should be dealt with solely through 
the school’s internal adjudicatory system using the DOE’s framework. See, e.g., Katharine 
K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 267–79 
(2015); Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “Decriminalizing” Campus Institutional Responses to Peer 
Sexual Violence, 38 J.C. & U.L. 481, 518–24 (2012).  Others have argued that law 
enforcement should handle all sexual assault accusations. See, e.g., Stephen Henrick, A 
Hostile Environment for Student Defendants:  Title IX and Sexual Assault on College 
Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 60–61 (2013); Jed Rubenfeld, Opinion, Mishandling Rape, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/ 
mishandling-rape.html [https://perma.cc/7JCM-X7PG]. 
 42. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 2. 
 43. See Matthew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College Campuses:  Seeking the 
Appropriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 492–
93 (2012). 
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appropriately respond to allegations.44  The primary objective of a school’s 
adjudicatory system is to “combat sexual violence, sexual assault, and 
sexual harassment on [college] campuses; navigate the legal and regulatory 
challenges inherent to doing so; and, more broadly, foster a culture of 
respect, inclusion, and civility.”45 
1.  Due Process 
Disciplinary proceedings at public colleges must afford students limited 
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.46  As 
public schools are considered state actors for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,47 any action by a school that deprives a student of “life,” 
“liberty,” or “property” without due process of law is a due process 
violation.48 
The Fifth Circuit first recognized the procedural due process rights of 
public school students in the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama State 
Board of Education.49  In Goss v. Lopez,50 the Supreme Court further 
recognized that students must be afforded due process before they are 
deprived of their education, in which they have a property interest.51  The 
Court also found that students have a “liberty” interest in their education 
because expulsion or suspension from school threatens a person’s “good 
name, reputation, honor, or integrity.”52  Any deprivation of a student’s 
 
 44. See Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”:  An Essay on University Policies 
Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 388–89 
(2015) (“Underlying any critique of the current processes for investigation, adjudication, and 
prevention shaped by federal law is the concern that we in higher education are doing right 
by those who have suffered sexual violence and sexual assault, and doing all that is within 
our power to prevent sexual violence and sexual assault from happening in the first place.”). 
 45. See id. at 389. 
 46. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574–76 (1975) (interpreting Dixon v. Alabama 
State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961), to stand for the proposition that 
public institutions owe students procedural due process rights before they are suspended or 
expelled from the institution); see also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 12 
(“Public and state-supported schools must provide due process to the alleged perpetrator.”). 
 47. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574–76; Dixon, 294 F.2d at 155; Gary Pavela & Gregory 
Pavela, The Ethical and Educational Imperative of Due Process, 38 J.C. & U.L. 567, 581–89 
(2012). 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 557–59 (4th ed. 2011).  This Note addresses only procedural 
due process issues with respect to school disciplinary procedures. 
 49. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that the school should have afforded the 
student procedural due process prior to suspending him for ten days). 
 50. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 51. Id. at 576.  Courts have not held that Dixon and Goss apply to private schools. See, 
e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542–47 (1987); Doe 
v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 
2015).  Thus, private schools need not afford their students the same due process protections 
as public institutions.  Private school students who believe they have been wrongly expelled 
or suspended can sue their schools in tort or for breach of contract and have recently begun 
to seek legal recourse for gender discrimination under Title IX. See infra notes 212, 295; 
infra Part II.B.2. 
 52. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 
(1971)). 
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“property interest in educational benefits . . . [or] liberty interest in 
reputation” without due process is therefore unconstitutional.53  Although 
the Court in Goss was faced with the disciplinary proceedings of a 
secondary school, courts have extended the holding in Goss to higher 
education institutions, including public colleges.54 
Goss recognized that the process owed to the accused depends on the 
circumstances of each case and involves balancing the parties’ interests.55  
Due process requires, at a minimum, the opportunity to be heard “at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”56  However, courts have not 
uniformly recognized what process is owed to public school students in 
disciplinary proceedings.57 
2.  Title IX 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, applicable to all schools 
receiving federal funds—including both public and private institutions—
prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs and activities.58  In 
2001, the DOE’s OCR found that sexual harassment and assault was a form 
of sex discrimination under Title IX,59 and the Supreme Court has 
recognized this interpretation of Title IX in private lawsuits against 
schools.60 
 
 53. Id. at 576. 
 54. See Pavela & Pavela, supra note 47, at 583–85; see also Lavina M. Weizel, Note, 
The Process That Is Due:  Preponderance of the Evidence As the Standard of Proof for 
University Adjudications of Student-On-Student Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
1613, 1622–23 (2012). 
 55. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 577–84; see also Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 
150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961) (“The minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due 
process depend upon the circumstances and the interests of the parties involved.”). 
 56. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); see also Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. 
 57. See Triplett, supra note 43, at 500–02; see also infra Part II.B.1. 
 58. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”). 
 59. See 2001 OCR GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 3. 
 60. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (holding that 
schools may be liable to students for student-on-student sexual harassment when the school 
is “deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which [the school has] actual knowledge, 
that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the 
victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school”).  
Under Davis, accusers can sue their schools for failing to properly investigate and adjudicate 
sexual assault accusations. See, e.g., Albiez v. Kaminski, No. 09-cv-1127, 2010 WL 
2465502, at *5 (E.D. Wis. June 14, 2010); Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. Civ.A. 3:01-cv-1591, 
2003 WL 1563424, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003); see also Henrick, supra note 41, at 73–
76.  Courts have not generally recognized an equivalent private right of action for those 
accused who believe that their school has been “deliberately indifferent” to an allegedly 
defective hearing, or their innocence, because it does not constitute sexual harassment. See, 
e.g., Doe v. Salisbury Univ., No. JKB-15-517, 2015 WL 5005811, at *12 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 
2015); Doe v. Univ. of S., 687 F. Supp. 2d 744, 757–59 (E.D. Tenn. 2009); see also Henrick, 
supra note 41, at 74–75. But see Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 751 (S.D. Ohio 
2014) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that the school was 
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OCR oversees federally funded institutions to identify instances of sex 
discrimination.61  OCR issued guidance in 2001 requiring schools to take 
“prompt and effective action to end harassment, prevent it from recurring, 
and remedy the effects of the harassment on the victim” as soon as the 
school knows or reasonably should know of the harassment.62  The 2001 
guidance also states that “[p]reventing and remedying sexual harassment in 
schools is essential to ensuring a safe environment in which students can 
learn.”63  Thus, to comply with the requirements of Title IX, schools must 
independently investigate and adjudicate accusations of student-on-student 
sexual harassment and assault.64 
OCR issued a “Dear Colleague” letter on April 4, 2011, which 
supplemented its 2001 guidance.65  The letter outlines procedural 
requirements for schools’ investigation and adjudication of sexual assault 
accusations, including providing training to officials participating in 
disciplinary proceedings66 and taking interim steps to ensure the safety of 
the accuser throughout the process.67  The letter requires that schools adopt 
and publish notice of nondiscrimination and grievance procedures and 
appoint a Title IX coordinator to ensure compliance.68  As to the rights of 
accused students, the letter states that schools “must provide due process to 
the alleged perpetrator” but it should not “restrict or unnecessarily delay the 
Title IX protections for the complainant.”69 
The letter does not require that schools hold hearings, but indicates that 
schools must “provide equitable grievance procedures.”70  These equitable 
procedures should include adhering to a preponderance of the evidence 
standard of proof,71 notifying both parties of the school’s determination 
within sixty days,72 and providing equal opportunities for both parties to 
 
deliberately indifferent to the alleged defective hearing because the school disregarded 
warnings from the prosecutor that the accuser had made false allegations). 
 61. See Frequently Asked Questions About Sexual Harassment, Including Sexual 
Violence, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFF. CIV. RTS. (2015), http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/qa-sexharass.html [https://perma.cc/8D2Y-HPTA]. 
 62. 2001 OCR GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 12. 
 63. Id. at ii. 
 64. See id. at 3–4. 
 65. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32.  Some commentators have noted that 
this guidance did not follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures and have argued 
that it is thus not legally binding on schools. See, e.g., Henrick, supra note 41, at 60–61; 
Napolitano, supra note 44, at 394–95.  The OCR stated that notice-and-comment rulemaking 
was not required because the guidance “does not add requirements to applicable law.” DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 1 n.1. 
 66. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 12. 
 67. Id. at 15. 
 68. Id. at 4, 7. 
 69. Id. at 12. 
 70. Id. at 10. 
 71. Id. at 10–11.  Previously, schools typically adhered to the “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings. See Djuna Perkins, Behind the Headlines:  An 
Insider’s Guide to Title IX and the Student Discipline Process for Campus Sexual Assaults, 
59 BOS. B.J. 19 (2015).  This is a higher standard of proof than the “preponderance of the 
evidence,” or “more likely than not,” standard. See id. 
 72. See id. at 12–14. 
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present witnesses and evidence, review the opposing party’s statements,73 
and appeal the school’s judgment.74  The OCR emphasized that criminal 
investigations may occur in parallel with school disciplinary proceedings, 
but also that the investigations should not be determinative of one 
another.75 
Schools are not required to allow students to retain legal representation 
throughout the process.76  However, if a school does allow legal 
representation, the school must afford that right to each party equally.77  
Additionally, the letter “strongly discourages schools from allowing the 
parties personally to question or cross-examine each other.”78 
OCR issued additional guidance on April 29, 2014,79 mandating that 
schools use the preponderance of the evidence standard and ensure the 
complainant’s safety during the disciplinary proceedings.80  The guidance 
also suggests that schools do not use students as adjudicators in disciplinary 
proceedings81 and requires that investigators and adjudicators be prohibited 
from asking questions about the accuser’s past sexual encounters with 
anyone other than the accused.82 
Institutions risk loss of funding83 and the initiation of an OCR 
investigation84 if they do not to comply with these requirements.85  This 
leverage allows the OCR to set standards for sexual assault disciplinary 
proceedings on many college campuses.86 
 
 73. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 11–12. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. at 10. 
 76. See id. at 12. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE 
IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014) [hereinafter OCR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS], 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4TAL-T8JD]. 
 80. See id. at 13; see also Perkins, supra note 71. 
 81. See OCR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 79, at 30 n.30. 
 82. See id. at 31; see also Perkins, supra note 71. 
 83. See Major Robert E. Murdough, Barracks, Dormitories, and Capitol Hill:  Finding 
Justice in the Divergent Politics of Military and College Sexual Assault, 223 MIL. L. REV. 
233, 253 n.90 (2015); see also Charles M. Sevilla, Campus Sexual Assault Allegations, 
Adjudications, and Title IX, CHAMPION, Nov. 2015, at 16. 
 84. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Releases List 




 85. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 16. 
 86. See id.; see also Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived “Catch-22”:  
Providing Fairness to Both the Accused and Complaining Students in College Sexual Assault 
Disciplinary Proceedings, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 277, 281–83 (2009); Sevilla, supra note 83, at 
19. 
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B.  Recent Legislation 
Some colleges have declined to follow the OCR’s guidance, and their 
disciplinary procedures have been scrutinized as a result.87  Coupled with 
high rates of sexual assault on college campuses, this has sparked a national 
conversation and prompted efforts from the White House,88 Congress, and 
state legislatures89 to prevent and appropriately deal with sexual assault on 
college campuses. 
Most notably, Congress passed the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination 
Act (Campus SaVE Act or “the Act”) on March 7, 2013.90  The Campus 
SaVE Act was intended to increase transparency with respect to sexual 
violence on campus.91  First, the Act mandates that schools report instances 
of domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking.92  Additionally, the Act 
requires that schools publish the details of their disciplinary proceedings, 
develop awareness and prevention programs, and provide training for all 
participating school officials.93 
The Act codifies part of the OCR guidance from the “Dear Colleague” 
letter, including the requirements that schools publish the details of their 
 
 87. The OCR has launched numerous investigations into colleges’ responses to sexual 
assault allegations. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 84.  Colleges’ handling of sexual 
assault accusations also has faced much scrutiny in the media in recent years. See, e.g., 
Bogdanich, supra note 35; Robin Wilson, Colleges Under Investigation for Sexual Assault 
Wonder What Getting It Right Looks Like, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Under-Investigation/232205 [https://perma.cc/398Q-
NURK]. 
 88. On January 22, 2014, President Obama established a White House Task Force to 
Protect Students from Sexual Assault (“the Task Force”). See Press Release, White House 
Office of Press Sec’y, Memorandum—Establishing a White House Task Force to Protect 
Students from Sexual Assault (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/22/memorandum-establishing-white-house-task-force-protect-students-
sexual-a [https://perma.cc/SSK8-K83N].  The Task Force released its first report in April 
2014, which sanctioned much of what was included in the OCR’s “Dear Colleague” letter. 
See generally NOT ALONE:  THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO 
PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT (2014), https://www.notalone.gov/assets/ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5H9-HGLH]; see also Perkins, supra note 71, at 20. 
 89. California and New York recently passed affirmative consent laws, or “yes means 
yes” laws, which require that college students obtain “affirmative consent” prior to and while 
engaging in sexual activity. See Aaron Mendelson, California Passes ‘Yes-Means-Yes’ 
Campus Sexual Assault Bill, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/08/29/us-usa-california-sexcrimes-idUSKBN0GT0U920140829 [https://perma.cc/ 
7TD4-3HH9]; Press Release, Governor Cuomo Signs ‘Enough is Enough’ Legislation to 
Combat Sexual Assault on College and University Campuses (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-enough-enough-legislation-
combat-sexual-assault-college-and-university [https://perma.cc/A9TG-V8GQ].  Many other 
states are considering implementing similar laws. See Jennifer Medina, Sex Ed Lesson:  “Yes 
Means Yes,” But It’s Tricky, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/ 
15/us/california-high-schools-sexual-consent-classes.html [https://perma.cc/46Y9-V3F7]. 
 90. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 
§ 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89–92 (2013) (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)). 
 91. See Susan Hanley Duncan, The Devil Is in the Details:  Will the Campus SaVE Act 
Provide More or Less Protection to Victims of Campus Assaults?, 40 J.C. & U.L. 443, 444 
(2014). 
 92. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act § 304(a). 
 93. Id. § 304(a)(5). 
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disciplinary procedures, provide appropriate notice to the parties, and create 
awareness and prevention programs.94  Notably, however, the Campus 
SaVE Act does not codify the use of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard.95  The Act solely requires that schools use a uniform standard and 
provide a “prompt, fair, and impartial” proceeding and determination.96  
This includes permitting both parties to have others present at the hearing 
and informing both parties simultaneously of any decisions in writing.97 
Additionally, the Campus SaVE Act implements numerous requirements 
to protect accusers98:  (1)  the accuser must be informed of the policy and 
potential sanctions and be provided contact information for medical, 
counseling, and legal services; (2)  the accuser can ask for changes in their 
academic, living, and working conditions; (3)  schools must assist accusers 
in obtaining legal protection from the accused, such as a restraining order; 
and (4)  schools must assist accusers if they choose to pursue criminal 
charges.99 
C.  Newly Proposed Legislation 
OCR guidance and the Campus SaVE Act have not quelled the debate 
surrounding the proper adjudication of campus sexual assault.  Scholars 
have criticized the current procedures as lacking adequate protection for the 
accused.100  Congress has since proposed three bills aimed at reducing the 
prevalence of sexual assault on college campuses.  Of the three, one 
purports to provide additional protection for accusers, and two intend to add 
additional due process protections for the accused. 
1.  The Campus Accountability and Safety Act (CASA) 
Congress is currently considering the Campus Accountability and Safety 
Act (CASA), which would standardize college responses to sexual assault 
allegations and provide additional procedural protection for accusers.101  
The bill would require schools to (1)  appoint a confidential advisor for 
accusers to provide support and assistance throughout the reporting and 
healing process, (2)  provide accusers and the accused with notice of the 
initiation of an investigation within twenty-four hours, (3)  provide 
 
 94. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 13–15. 
 95. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act § 304(a)(5). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Duncan, supra note 91, at 453. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act § 304(a)(5). 
 100. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-
harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/K8XU-NCJ9]; Eugene Volokh, Open Letter from 16 Penn Law School 




 101. See generally Campus Accountability and Safety Act, S. 590, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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specialized training for all involved in the proceedings, and (4)  enter a 
memorandum of understanding with local law enforcement to delineate the 
roles that each would play during an investigation of a sexual assault 
accusation.102  CASA also would create a safe harbor provision for 
reporting students and impose fees upon schools for noncompliance.103 
The bill would additionally implement requirements that schools survey 
their students every two years about their experiences with sexual violence 
and publish the results.104  The DOE also would be required to publish the 
names of schools under investigation for Title IX violations.105 
2.  The Safe Campus Act and the Fair Campus Act 
The previous section outlined the provisions of CASA, a bill that aims to 
add additional protections for accusers.  Dueling bills also have been 
proposed which would greatly increase the procedural due process 
protections of the accused in campus sexual assault disciplinary 
proceedings. 
Congress is currently considering two related bills:  the Safe Campus 
Act106 and the Fair Campus Act.107  The bills are substantively very similar.  
Both would require that accusers and the accused receive written notice of 
the initiation of an investigation and a meaningful opportunity to respond to 
allegations, the right to representation (by an attorney or other advocate), 
and the right to examine witnesses.108  Both bills further mandate that 
colleges make all evidence available to both parties.109  To limit conflicts of 
interest, individuals would not be permitted to play multiple roles in the 
investigation and adjudicatory processes.110  Reporting students and 
witnesses also would receive safe harbor assurance so that they will not be 
punished for other violations that are revealed because of their 
cooperation.111  Further, both of the proposed bills would allow a school to 
use the standard of proof that it deems appropriate.112  Finally, each would 
create a private right of action for students found erroneously responsible 
for sexual assault, allowing them to bring a federal civil action against their 
schools within a year of the decision.113  A court would then review the 
school’s decision to determine whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, or 
contrary to law.”114 
 
 102. Id. §§ 3, 4, 7. 
 103. Id. § 4. 
 104. Id. § 2. 
 105. Id. § 5. 
 106. Safe Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 107. Fair Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3408, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 108. See H.R. 3403 § 2; H.R. 3408 § 2. 
 109. See H.R. 3403 § 2; H.R. 3408 § 2. 
 110. See H.R. 3403 § 2; H.R. 3408 § 2. 
 111. See H.R. 3403 § 2; H.R. 3408 § 2. 
 112. See H.R. 3403 § 2; H.R. 3408 § 2. 
 113. See H.R. 3403 § 2; H.R. 3408 § 2. 
 114. See H.R. 3403 § 2; H.R. 3408 § 2. 
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The sole difference between the two bills is the proposed role of law 
enforcement in campus disciplinary proceedings.  The Safe Campus Act 
would require schools to alert law enforcement of any sexual assault 
allegations before initiating an investigation on their own.115  If the alleged 
victim reported the incident to the school but did not wish to involve the 
police, “the institution may not initiate or otherwise carry out any 
institutional disciplinary proceeding with respect to the allegation.”116  
Thus, under the Safe Campus Act, law enforcement would have to be 
notified for the accuser to seek justice in any capacity.117  The Fair Campus 
Act includes no such provision.118 
II.  EVALUATING CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES:  JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The recent national focus on sexual assault and the newly proposed 
legislation highlight the tension between the interests of the accusers, the 
accused, and the schools with respect to campus sexual assault disciplinary 
tribunals.  This part outlines the issues with which courts have grappled to 
evaluate the current model of campus sexual assault tribunals and whether it 
strikes the appropriate balance between these competing interests.  Part II.A 
describes the competing interests at stake.  Part II.B then focuses on judicial 
review and examines the methods that courts have used to evaluate the 
decisions of campus sexual assault tribunals on both public and private 
college campuses. 
A.  Competing Interests 
All students have an interest in their education that schools must protect 
to the utmost extent.119  Education plays a paramount role in society today.  
Thus, school disciplinary procedures should promote a secure environment 
conducive to learning and avoid erroneously denying students their 
education. 
1.  Interests of the Accusers and the Accused 
Considering the prevalence of sexual assault on college campuses,120 a 
school’s priority should be to protect its students from sexual violence.  For 
victims, sexual assault is a traumatizing event that often bears lifelong 
consequences.121  These symptoms may be exacerbated if the assailant 
 
 115. See H.R. 3403 § 2. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See H.R. 3408 § 2. 
 119. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988) (“The interests of 
students in completing their education, as well as avoiding unfair or mistaken exclusion from 
the educational environment, and the accompanying stigma are, of course, paramount.”). 
 120. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Kathryn M. Reardon, Acquaintance Rape at Private Colleges and Universities:  
Providing for Victims’ Educational and Civil Rights, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 395, 398 
(2005).  While the lifelong effects of sexual assault on victims should not be overlooked, this 
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remains on campus,122 and therefore an accuser’s primary goal when 
initiating proceedings may be to remove the accused from campus.  An 
accused student’s presence on campus may effectively deny an accuser his 
or her right to an education.123  As such, accusers have an interest in fast 
proceedings and hearings that do not require them to confront the 
accused.124  Further, some argue that school procedures should be “victim-
centered,” or primarily intended to protect the alleged victim of sexual 
assault.125 
However, accused students have an interest in their education and 
protecting their public image, both of which are important for a student’s 
education and eventual professional life.  The consequences of expulsion 
from a college can be long lasting.126  Students dismissed from school 
retain disciplinary records that can impede transfer to another school, 
graduation, and admission to graduate and professional schools.127  Because 
many jobs require specified degrees, expulsion has the potential to limit 
severely a student’s future career options.128  Accused students also have an 
interest in protecting their good name.129  The internet and the prevalence 
of social media on college campuses likely intensifies the effect an 
erroneous conviction can have on a student’s reputation. 
 
Note focuses solely on the accusers’ interests in the context of school disciplinary 
proceedings. 
 122. See id. at 398–99. 
 123. See Sarah Edwards, The Case in Favor of OCR’s Tougher Title IX Policies:  
Pushing Back Against the Pushback, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 121, 137 (2015) 
(“Unlike the criminal justice system, universities have the power to separate the victim from 
her attacker once a report is received, thus minimizing the risk that the victim will be 
deprived of access to education and the ability to succeed at her school.”). 
 124. Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities:  A 
Roadmap for “Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 
660 (2001). 
 125. See, e.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Campus Violence:  Understanding the 
Extraordinary Through the Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 613, 682–83 (2009) [hereinafter 
Cantalupo, Campus Violence]; Nancy Chi Cantalupo, How Should Colleges and Universities 
Respond to Peer Sexual Violence on Campus?  What the Current Legal Environment Tells 
Us, 3 NASPA J. ABOUT WOMEN HIGHER EDUC. 49, 57–66, 70–74 (2010) [hereinafter 
Cantalupo, College Response]; see also Diane L. Rosenfeld, Commentary, Uncomfortable 
Conversations:  Confronting the Reality of Target Rape on Campus, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 
359, 369 (2015). 
 126. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975) (noting that a student being suspended 
from high school could impact future employment opportunities); see also Tenerowicz, 
supra note 124, at 683. 
 127. See Robert B. Groholski, Comment, The Right to Representation by Counsel in 
University Disciplinary Proceedings:  A Denial of Due Process of Law, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
739, 786–87 (1999); see also Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 683.  However, it has been 
argued that few students that are found responsible for sexual assault are actually expelled. 
See Tylor Kingkade, Fewer than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result in 
Expulsion, HUFFINGTON POST:  BREAKING THE SILENCE (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/29/campus-sexual-assault_n_5888742.html 
[https://perma.cc/9NK3-YHUK]. 
 128. See Goholski, supra note 127, at 786; see also Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 683. 
 129. See Goholski, supra note 127, at 786–87; see also Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 
683. 
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Additionally, accused students have an interest in the assistance of legal, 
or other, representation to navigate the often-intimidating school 
disciplinary process.130  This interest is particularly high for accused 
students because testimony delivered during an on-campus hearing may be 
admissible in a criminal proceeding related to the same charges.131 
Both accusers and the accused have an interest in fair proceedings that 
effectively adjudicate sexual assault accusations.  For accusers, this 
includes fast and efficient proceedings with minimal due process 
protections for the accused, particularly no guarantee of a right to 
confront132 and the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard of 
proof.133  For the accused, this includes an adversarial hearing with the 
opportunity to confront the accuser and adverse witnesses, unbiased 
investigators and adjudicators, the right to representation, and the use of a 
higher standard of proof than the preponderance of the evidence 
standard.134 
2.  Interests of the School 
Schools are under pressure to handle sexual assault allegations 
effectively and to protect their student bodies through effectuating 
procedures that appropriately balance the interests of the accusers and the 
accused.  In doing so, schools must also consider their limited resources and 
the cost of additional procedure.135 
 
 130. See Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 692; see also Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, 
Academic Discipline:  A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 289, 341 (1999); Groholski, supra note 127, at 789. 
 131. See Douglas R. Richmond, Students’ Right to Counsel in University Disciplinary 
Proceedings, 15 J.C. & U.L. 289, 300 (1989); Lisa L. Swem, Note, Due Process Rights in 
Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. & U.L. 359, 373 (1987); Tenerowicz, supra note 124, 
at 691. 
 132. The “Dear Colleague” letter indicated that allowing the parties to personally cross-
examine each other “may be traumatic or intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or 
perpetuating a hostile environment.” DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 12; see 
also Swem, supra note 131, at 377; Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 690. 
 133. A controversial aspect of the “Dear Colleague” letter is the mandated use of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  Some argue that it unfairly tips the scale in favor of 
the accusers. See, e.g., Ryan D. Ellis, Mandating Injustice:  The Preponderance of the 
Evidence Mandate Creates a New Threat to Due Process on Campus, 32 REV. LITIG. 65, 80–
81 (2013); Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, A Brick on the Other:  
Tilting the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary 
Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 610–15 (2013).  Others argue that it appropriately protects 
the interests of the accusers over those of the accused. See Weizel, supra note 54, at 1645–55 
(arguing that the preponderance of the evidence standard appropriately balances the interests 
of accused students in continued education, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the students’ 
interests, and the schools’ interest in responding to sexual assault on campus under Mathews 
v. Eldridge); see also Edwards, supra note 123, at 132–36; Amy Chmielewski, Note and 
Comment, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in College Adjudications 
of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 148. 
 134. See infra notes 272–84. 
 135. See Hogan, supra note 86, at 282–83. 
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First, schools have an interest in maintaining order on their campuses and 
protecting the student body.136  Policies and procedures that fail to punish 
students for their wrongful acts will allow violent students to remain on 
campuses, which can create a safety risk and a hostile environment.137 
Similarly, schools have an interest in complying with Title IX because 
noncompliance can compel an OCR investigation and loss of funding.138  
The threat of revocation of federal funds incentivizes schools to punish all 
students accused of sexual assault.139 
Schools also have an interest in preserving private funding by protecting 
their reputation and managing their public image.140  Many colleges that 
rely on private donations fear that negative media attention about sexual 
assaults could impact contributions.141  On the other hand, students found 
responsible for sexual assault have argued that adverse media attention has 
had a contrary effect by causing schools to “railroad” students and 
invariably find the accused responsible.142 
Finally, schools have an interest in avoiding litigation.143  Wronged 
victims generally have had more success suing their schools for improperly 
handling sexual assault accusations than the accused have had suing their 
schools for due process violations, Title IX discrimination, or breaches of 
contract.144  Commentators have argued that this unequal threat of litigation 
incentivizes schools to hold accused students accountable by implementing 
and conducting proceedings that are unfairly stacked against the accused.145 
B.  The Courts Weigh In:  
Judicial Review of Campus Disciplinary Tribunal Decisions 
The wave of new standards on college campuses has demonstrated that 
“the legislative and executive branches clearly expect[] college officials to 
adjudicate potential sex crimes, to do so swiftly and harshly, and that due 
process would be of secondary concern.”146  As a result, those accused of 
sexual misconduct, and who believe that they erroneously were found 
 
 136. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975); see also Berger & Berger, supra note 
130, at 353. 
 137. See generally Cantalupo, supra note 41; Edwards, supra note 123, at 137 
(“[C]ampus adjudication of sexual violence is an anti-discrimination right, protecting 
students’ access to educational opportunities at their respective schools.”). 
 138. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Henrick, supra note 41, at 81. 
 140. See id. at 81–83. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See, e.g., Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *8, 
*10 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1661 (2d Cir. May 21, 2015). 
 143. See Henrick, supra note 41, at 81. 
 144. See id. at 77–79; see also Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Violating Student Victims’ Rights Is 
Expensive, TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/99697/campus-sexual-assault-nancy-chi-
cantalupo/ (“[S]chools face exponentially more expensive liability for violating student 
victims’ rights under Title IX . . . than they do for violating accused assailants’ due process 
rights.”) [https://perma.cc/D3EQ-25EW]. 
 145. See Sevilla, supra note 83, at 19; see also Henrick, supra note 41, at 75. 
 146. Murdough, supra note 83, at 254. 
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responsible because of fundamentally unfair adjudicatory procedures, have 
filed an increasing number of lawsuits against their schools.147  Part II.B.1 
outlines the recent cases in which students have alleged that their schools’ 
disciplinary proceedings were fundamentally unfair and violated their due 
process rights.  Part II.B.2 then outlines the recent Title IX cases in which 
students have alleged that their schools erroneously found them responsible 
for sexual assault due to gender discrimination.  Part II.B.3 discusses the 
implications of the cases discussed in the two previous sections. 
It is important to note that the role of courts in reviewing decisions of 
colleges is “neither to advocate for the best practices or policies nor to retry 
disciplinary proceedings.”148  However, courts’ focus on determining the 
merits of due process and Title IX claims sheds light on potential best 
practices for handling sexual misconduct on college campuses. 
1.  Due Process Cases 
After the OCR issued its “Dear Colleague” letter in 2011, a number of 
students who alleged that they had been wrongfully found responsible for 
sexual assault sued their schools for procedural due process violations.149  
However, because students facing disciplinary action at school do not face 
the same consequences that they would face in the criminal justice 
system,150 courts have been hesitant to overturn these decisions as long as 
the schools afforded students minimal due process protections.151  Recently, 
however, courts have overturned the findings of campus tribunals in two 
cases, perhaps signaling the beginning of the courts’ recognition of the 
fundamentally unfair nature of school procedures after the “Dear 
Colleague” letter.152  This section outlines what courts have considered due 
process violations to identify the elements of campus procedures in need of 
reform. 
 
 147. According to data tracking all of the due process lawsuits brought by students found 
responsible for sexual misconduct violations, over 100 lawsuits have been filed since OCR’s 
issuance of its “Dear Colleague” letter. See Database:  Due Process Lawsuits Against 
Colleges and Universities, BOYS & MEN EDUC. (updated Nov. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Due 
Process Database], http://boysmeneducation.com/lawsuits-database/#lawsuits/?view_14_ 
sort=field_19|desc&view_14_per_page=all&view_14_page=1 [https://perma.cc/YR5B-
AKNW]. 
 148. Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Doe v. Univ. of 
S., 687 F. Supp. 2d 744, 755 (E.D. Tenn. 2009)). 
 149. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Cantalupo, supra note 41, at 517 (“[T]he deprivations of property involved in a 
school expulsion are not comparable to sending someone to jail and potentially requiring 
registration as a sex offender.”). 
 151. See Schaer v. Brandies Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Mass. 2000) (“A university is 
not required to adhere to the standards of due process guaranteed to criminal 
defendants . . . .”); see also Cantalupo, supra note 41, at 512–15. 
 152. See Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II, at *23 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 
Aug. 10, 2015); Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-
WM-CTL, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015) (order granting petition for writ of 
mandamus), appeal docketed, No. D068901 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2015).  This unreported 
order can be found at http://www.nacua.org/documents/Doe_v_RegentsUCASanDiego.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RSB-JW3D]. 
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To evaluate whether a school has violated a student’s due process rights, 
courts consider a number of factors including whether the school provided 
the student with adequate notice of the charges against him or her, whether 
the school conducted a proper hearing, whether the school afforded the 
student the right to confront, and whether the school provided the student 
with a right to counsel.153  Recent cases demonstrate that courts have not 
been consistent with respect to what constitutes a due process violation.154  
Instead, courts have recognized that due process is meant to be a flexible 
standard and that the process owed in a particular situation depends on the 
balancing of the three factors that the Supreme Court articulated in 
Mathews v. Eldridge155: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.156 
Courts have found that due process requires that the accused receive 
sufficient notice of the charges against him or her in a sufficient amount of 
time prior to the commencement of disciplinary proceedings.157  
Additionally, one court has held a denial of a hearing to be a due process 
violation, even where the accused student had the opportunity to respond to 
the allegations against him through various meetings and writings.158 
Courts have generally found that students do not have a right to counsel 
in the context of school disciplinary proceedings159 and that a student’s 
counsel need not be permitted to take part in disciplinary hearings.160 
 
 153. See infra notes 157–65 and accompanying text. 
 154. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-
CTL, at *4 (order granting petition for writ of mandamus); Sterret v. Cowan, 85 F. Supp. 3d 
916, 929 (E.D. Mich. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-1121 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015). 
 155. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 156. Id. at 335. 
 157. See Tanyi v. Appalachian State Univ., No. 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853, at 
*6 (W.D.N.C. July 22, 2015) (finding that “at a minimum due process requires adequate 
notice” and that less than twenty-four-hours notice of a charge against plaintiff warranted 
denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 
(1975))); Sterret, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 927 (holding that a student receiving notice of the 
charges against him after an initial interview “may state a claim of a violation of his due 
process in light of the length of his suspension”). 
 158. See Sterret, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
 159. See Tanyi, 2015 WL 4478853, at *4 (“The Due Process Clause does not necessarily 
require that students facing expulsion be represented by licensed attorneys.”); Gorman v. 
Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Hogan, supra note 86, at 289–91.  In 
the past, courts have split as to whether students should be afforded the right to legal counsel 
in school disciplinary hearings. See Swem, supra note 131, at 372. 
 160. See Tanyi, 2015 WL 4478853, at *4 (citing Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th 
Cir. 1993)); see also Johanna Matloff, Note, The New Star Chamber:  An Illusion of Due 
Process Standards at Private University Disciplinary Hearings, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 169, 
172–73, 172 n.23 (2001) (discussing whether attorneys should function solely as advisors or 
should be permitted to play an active role in the disciplinary proceedings).  Courts 
additionally have split about the role that counsel should play in school disciplinary 
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Courts also have considered whether schools must provide accused 
students with the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses and 
accusers.161  Generally, students are not entitled to cross-examination at 
school disciplinary hearings.162  However, where the charges are 
particularly serious—such as sexual assault—courts have been more willing 
to find that schools should grant students the right to cross-examination.163  
In some cases, permitting the accused student to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses through the hearing panel by submitting questions to the panel to 
ask the accuser questions at their discretion is sufficient.164  However, a 
recent state court found this method to be fundamentally unfair to the 
accused.165 
The denial of the accused student’s right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, especially the accuser, was a significant factor in the San 
Diego Superior Court’s recent ruling overturning the findings of a 
University of San Diego campus tribunal.166  In Doe v. Regents of the 
University of California San Diego,167 the court found that the use of the 
tribunal as an intermediary and the placing of the accuser behind a barrier 
unfairly limited the accused student’s right to confront.168  The Panel Chair 
asked only nine out of the thirty-two questions that the accused student 
submitted to the panel and did not ask any follow-up questions.169  With 
respect to the use of the barrier, the court found that this too unfairly limited 
 
proceedings, specifically as to whether their role should be solely advisory. See Groholoski, 
supra note 127, at 773–81; Swem, supra note 131, at 374. 
 161. See, e.g., Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-
CU-WM-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015) (order granting petition for writ of 
mandamus), appeal docketed, No. D068901 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2015); Sterret v. 
Cowan, 85 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Mich. 2015), appeal dismissed, No. 15-1121 (6th Cir. Feb. 
6, 2015). 
 162. See, e.g., Sterret, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 929 (“[C]onfronting the [c]omplainant, let alone 
other witnesses, is not an absolute right and is generally not part of the due process 
requirement in a school disciplinary setting.” (citations omitted)); see also Hogan, supra note 
86, at 291–92. 
 163. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-
CTL, at *4 (reversing the school’s determination because the school denied the student the 
opportunity to meaningfully cross-examine adverse witnesses); see also Hogan, supra note 
86, at 291–92. 
 164. See Hogan, supra note 86, at 292 (explaining that using the panel as an intermediary 
is an adequate alternative to direct examination, as “the thought of a student accused of rape 
cross-examining the student complainant is unsettling from a practical as well as legal 
standpoint in light of the university’s duties to the student complainant under Title IX”). 
 165. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 
at *4 (finding that only asking nine of the accused’s thirty-two questions “curtailed the right 
of confrontation crucial to any definition of a fair hearing”). 
 166. Id. at *2–4. 
 167. No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015) (order 
granting petition for writ of mandamus), appeal docketed, No. D068901 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 
11, 2015). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at *4. 
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the accused student’s right to confront, noting “the importance demeanor 
and non-verbal communication” play in “evaluat[ing] credibility.”170 
Excluding certain evidence also contributed to the court’s finding that the 
school inappropriately limited the accused student’s right to confront.171  
The court found that the introduction of a school investigator’s report 
without the investigator’s testimony at the hearing constituted a due process 
violation because the accused student did not have the opportunity to 
confront the investigator and “refute [her] findings.”172  Additionally, the 
accused student was not able to review the fourteen witness statements and 
the two interview statements of the accuser that the investigator relied on to 
generate the report.173  Further, the court found that the panel’s reliance on 
this report “improperly delegate[d] the panel’s duty to an outside witness 
that was not present at the hearing.”174 
In evaluating whether the school’s findings were supported by substantial 
evidence, the court criticized the tribunal’s failure to consider evidence of 
the parties’ actions after the alleged incident.175  The court found that the 
totality of the evidence, particularly because the accuser “admitted that she 
voluntarily continued consensual sexual activity with [the accused student] 
later that very same day,” did not show “non-consensual behavior,” but 
rather the accuser’s “personal regret for engaging in sexual activity beyond 
her boundaries.”176  The court noted that “[d]ue process requires that a 
hearing . . . be a real one, not a sham or a pretense.”177  The court reversed 
the school’s decision and held that the hearing was “unfair and that 
evidence did not support the findings.”178 
The court in Mock v. University of Tennessee at Chattanooga179 similarly 
reversed the decision of a school’s disciplinary tribunal finding that the 
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Chancellor presiding over the 
proceeding “improperly shifted the burden of proof and imposed an 
untenable standard upon Mr. Mock to disprove the accusation that he 
forcible [sic] assaulted Ms. Morris.”180  The court found that requiring the 
 
 170. Id. at *3.  Courts disagree as to whether placing the accuser behind a barrier during 
the proceedings diminishes the accused student’s opportunity to confront the accuser. 
Compare Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 720 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that use of a 
barrier did not constitute a due process violation), with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San 
Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, at *2; see also Hogan, supra note 86, at 293. 
 171. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 
at *3. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at *5. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at *3 (quoting Ciechon v. City of Chi., 686 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 178. Id. at *6. 
 179. No. 14-1687-II (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 10, 2015). 
 180. Id. at *23.  The school’s policy was similar to the affirmative consent laws that 
California and New York have passed. See supra note 89.  Extended discussion regarding 
the constitutionality of affirmative consent laws aside from discussion of Mock is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  However, this case suggests that affirmative consent laws deny accused 
students their due process rights. See Sevilla, supra note 83, at 19 (discussing the implication 
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accused to prove that he received affirmative consent is “flawed and 
untenable if due process is to be afforded the accused.”181  The court further 
emphasized that this policy lacks “fundamental fairness” due to the 
difficulties that students would have in proving that they received 
affirmative consent.182 
In sum, courts employ a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a 
school has afforded a student adequate due process during a disciplinary 
proceeding.  Courts generally have been reluctant to overturn the decisions 
of campus tribunals and have set a high bar for what constitutes a due 
process violation.  However, Regents of the University of California San 
Diego and Mock demonstrate the lower threshold that two state courts have 
recently applied to determine whether a due process violation has occurred, 
highlighting the inadequacies of campus tribunals and perhaps signaling the 
need for reform.183 
2.  Title IX Cases:  Erroneous Outcome Claims 
Students accused of and found responsible for sexual assault violations 
on either private or public college campuses can bring Title IX claims in 
federal court alleging that their school intentionally discriminated against 
them on the basis of their gender.  Individuals can bring a Title IX claim 
against their school for intentional gender discrimination, similar to Title VI 
 
of Mock and the future of affirmative consent laws); see also Allison L. Marciniak, The Case 
Against Affirmative Consent:  Why the Well-Intentioned Legislation Dangerously Misses the 
Mark, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 51, 57–67 (2015) (arguing that California’s affirmative consent 
law mandating that school disciplinary hearings use a preponderance of the evidence 
standard denies the accused their due process rights). 
 181. Mock, No. 14-1687-II, at *11. 
 182. Id. at *12 (noting the near impossibility of proving affirmative consent, stating that 
“[a]bsent the tape recording of a verbal consent or other independent means to demonstrate 
that consent was given, the ability of an accused to prove the complaining party’s consent 
strains credulity and is illusory”). 
 183. See Mock, No. 14-1687-II; Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-
2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015) (order granting petition for 
writ of mandamus), appeal docketed, No. D068901 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2015); see also 
SAMANTHA HARRIS, HERITAGE FOUND., CAMPUS JUDICIARIES ON TRIAL:  AN UPDATE FROM 
THE COURTS 6 (2015), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2015/pdf/LM165.pdf (observing 
that state courts are more willing to overturn school disciplinary decisions if the student is 
able to demonstrate that the proceedings were unfair, while federal courts hold students to a 
more stringent standard, requiring that they demonstrate deprivation of due process rights) 
[https://perma.cc/LC38-693T].  Recently, courts have also expressed concern that interim 
suspensions violate an accused student’s presumption of innocence. See Robby Soave, Judge 
Stops USC from Expelling Football Player Who Failed to Prove He Wasn’t a Rapist, HIT & 
RUN BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015, 12:10 PM), https://reason.com/blog/2015/08/13/judge-stops-usc-
from-expelling-football (explaining the reinstatement of a  student found responsible for 
sexual assault citing due process concerns) [https://perma.cc/L8AC-LUB8]; see also Press 
Release, Werksman, Jackson, Hathaway & Quinn, LLP, California Judge Issues Stinging 
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claims on which Title IX was modeled.184  Courts have not recognized that 
students can bring Title IX claims based on the disparate impact theory, as 
individuals may bring with respect to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.185  Thus, because valid Title VI claims require that individuals prove 
discriminatory intent, courts have held that discriminatory intent, or proof 
that “gender bias [is] a motivating factor,” is similarly required for Title IX 
claims.186 
This intent requirement has proven difficult for plaintiffs to plead 
successfully and has resulted in frequent dismissals of students’ Title IX 
claims.187  Complaints that survive a motion to dismiss usually settle.188  
Nevertheless, the decisions in these cases, even at the pleading stage, are 
probative as to the fundamental fairness of campus sexual assault tribunals 
on college campuses. 
The Second Circuit in Yusuf v. Vassar College189 articulated the two 
categories of claims that students can bring to argue that a school’s 
disciplinary proceedings violated Title IX:  (1)  “erroneous outcome” claims 
and (2)  “selective enforcement” claims.190  In the erroneous outcome 
category, “the claim is that the plaintiff was innocent and wrongly found to 
have committed an offense.”191  In the selective enforcement category, the 
“claim asserts that, regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence, the 
severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was 
 
 184. See Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714–15 (2d Cir. 1994).  In Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, the Supreme Court held that Title IX should be interpreted similarly 
to Title VI. 441 U.S. 677, 690–98 (1979) (finding that Title IX prescribed a private right of 
action because it was “patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” which 
prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs or activities on the basis of race, color, 
or national origin).  The Court additionally has held that individuals cannot bring disparate 
impact claims under Title VI. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001); see also 
Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 
15-1661 (2d Cir. May 21, 2015).  Because individuals only can bring claims of intentional 
discrimination under Title VI, courts have dismissed Title IX claims based on a disparate 
impact theory. See, e.g., Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-CV-
209, 2015 WL 5553855, at *15 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2015); Weser v. Glen, 190 F. Supp. 2d 
384, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 41 F. App’x 521 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 185. See Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009)).  Under Title VII, individuals can bring claims for 
both intentional discrimination and practices or procedures that have a discriminatory effect, 
or disparate impact, on a protected class. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577. 
 186. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. 
 187. See, e.g., Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. at 374; George Mason Univ., 2015 WL 
5553855, at *16.  In fact, one commentator has referred to it as an “impossible to meet 
threshold.” See Henrick, supra note 41, at 75. 
 188. See, e.g., Yoffe, supra note 31; see also Justin Wm. Moyer, How a Michigan 
College Student Beat a Sexual Assault Allegation, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/16/how-a-college-student-
beat-a-sexual-assault-allegation/ [https://perma.cc/93QW-WJKV]; Ashe Schow, Here Come 
the Settlements Over Lack of Due Process in Campus Sexual Assault Hearings, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/here-come-the-settlements-
over-lack-of-due-process-in-campus-sexual-assault-hearings/article/2559331 
[https://perma.cc/4F4M-L4A8]. 
 189. 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 190. Id. at 715. 
 191. Id. 
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affected by the student’s gender.”192  The claims require the student to 
prove that the school either erroneously found him or her responsible or 
imposed a severe penalty because of the student’s gender.193  The court in 
Yusuf also emphasized that “wholly conclusory allegations” will not survive 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.194 
a.  The First Prong:  Flawed Proceeding 
Led to an Erroneous Outcome 
To assert a valid erroneous outcome claim, the plaintiff “must allege 
particular facts sufficient to cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of 
the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.”195  Examples of such facts 
include “procedural flaws affecting the proof” or “evidentiary weaknesses 
behind the finding of an offense such as a motive to lie on the part of the 
complainant or witnesses, particularized strengths of the defense, or other 
reason to doubt the veracity of the charge.”196  Additionally, the plaintiff 
must “allege particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a 
motivating factor behind the erroneous finding.”197  Examples include 
“statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent 
university officials, or patterns of decision-making that also tend to show 
the influence of gender.”198 
Courts have subsequently interpreted Yusuf to require that two prongs be 
met for a valid erroneous outcome claim.199  First, the student must 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  This Note focuses solely on the “erroneous outcome” category of Title IX 
claims, as most selective enforcement claims are similarly difficult to plead and dismissed 
for the same reason that erroneous outcome claims are dismissed—because of the difficulty 
in plausibly pleading that gender was the motivating factor behind either the flawed 
proceedings that led to an erroneous outcome or the severe punishment imposed upon the 
plaintiff. See, e.g., Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 
appeal docketed, No. 15-1661 (2d Cir. May 21, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff’s selective 
enforcement claim fails for the same reason as the plaintiff’s erroneous outcome claim—
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the school acted in a particular way because 
of the plaintiff’s gender).  The court in Columbia also indicated that selective enforcement 
claims must “include . . . allegations that female students ‘were treated more favorably in 
similar circumstances.’” Id. at 374–75 (citation omitted).  This is a particularly difficult 
pleading standard to meet as males are more frequently accused of sexual assault than 
females. See id.  Stating this alone, however, solely evidences proceedings that disadvantage 
the accused over the accusers and only has “the effect of burdening men more than women,” 
which is an unrecognized disparate impact claim. Id. 
 194. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. 
 195. Id.  At least one court has declined to follow the Second Circuit’s particularized fact 
pleading requirement. See Blank v. Knox Coll., No. 14-CV-1386, 2015 WL 328602, at *3 
(C.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2015) (finding the Yusuf standard to be “a pleading standard found in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that applies specifically to allegations of fraud or 
mistake”). 
 196. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See, e.g., Doe v. Salisbury Univ., No. JKB-15-517, 2015 WL 5005811, at *12 (D. 
Md. Aug. 21, 2015); Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-cv-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at 
*9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015). 
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demonstrate that the disciplinary proceedings were flawed and led to an 
erroneous outcome.200  Second, the student must demonstrate that gender 
bias was “a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding”201 and 
“establish a causal link between the erroneous outcome and the gender 
bias.”202 
The first prong of Yusuf generally has not been difficult for plaintiffs to 
satisfy203—demonstrating that many of the procedures in place at schools 
are flawed and lead to erroneous outcomes.  Courts look to a variety of 
factors to determine whether the first prong of the Yusuf framework is 
satisfied204 and have been rather consistent regarding what factors 
contribute to a finding that a disciplinary proceeding is procedurally 
flawed.205  Courts consider the alleged flaws together in determining 
whether the disciplinary proceedings were sufficiently flawed to cast doubt 
on the outcome of the investigation and adjudication.206 
Courts have looked holistically at whether the school’s procedures 
evidence an effort to rush to judgment to find an accused student 
responsible for sexual assault.207  For instance, courts have found that even 
a day’s notice of the charges against a student prior to a hearing were 
sufficient and did not evidence a rush to judgment.208  However, school 
officials’ failure to appropriately and adequately consider evidence does 
demonstrate a school’s intent to rush to judgment.209 
Courts also have found that the denial of the possibility to consult with an 
attorney during school disciplinary proceedings is not a Title IX 
violation.210  However, if the school’s handbook provides that the student 
has the right to counsel, a denial of that right is a procedural flaw that 
contributes to a finding that the first Yusuf prong is satisfied.211  In fact, 
straying from a school’s written policies and procedures is in and of itself 
evidence of flawed procedures.212  However, courts have found that “at 
 
 200. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at *9 (citing Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715). 
 203. See, e.g., Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at *10; Doe v. Rector & Visitors 
of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-CV-209, 2015 WL 5553855, at *16 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 
2015). 
 204. See infra notes 207–28 and accompanying text. 
 205. See, e.g., Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 462–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 206. See Doe v. Salisbury Univ., No. JKB-15-517, 2015 WL 5005811, at *13 (D. Md. 
Aug. 21, 2015). 
 207. See Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at *10 (finding that plaintiff’s alleged 
flaws in the school’s proceedings, including omitting and failing to consider particular 
evidence “amount[ed] to ‘a practice of railroading accused students’” (citation omitted)); see 
also Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 464–65; Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 752 (S.D. Ohio 
2014). 
 208. See Doe v. Univ. of S., 687 F. Supp. 3d 2d 744, 753 (E.D. Tenn. 2009); see also Yu, 
97 F. Supp. 3d at 464. 
 209. See Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at *10. 
 210. See, e.g., Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 464. 
 211. See Salisbury, 2015 WL 5005811, at *13; see also Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 464. 
 212. See Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 464.  In the private school setting, many states have 
recognized that noncompliance with a school’s written policy and procedures also can give 
rise to a claim of breach of contract. See Harris, supra note 183, at 7; see also, e.g., Yu, 97 F. 
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most the student has a right to get the advice of a lawyer; the lawyer need 
not be allowed to participate in the proceeding in the usual way of trial 
counsel.”213 
Additionally, courts have indicated that biased panel members render a 
disciplinary proceeding fundamentally unfair.214  However, courts have not 
found that the use of one individual to fulfill multiple roles throughout the 
proceeding to be a procedural flaw.215 
During the hearing, a school’s denial of a student’s opportunity to present 
witnesses is considered evidence of a flawed proceeding.216  Additionally, a 
tribunal’s failure to consider evidence makes it plausible that the 
disciplinary procedures may have led to an erroneous outcome.217  
Similarly, courts have considered whether schools provide students with 
information and evidence critical to their case prior to any hearing 
determination.218  Misuse of testimony and critical omissions to the panel 
are also significant procedural flaws.219 
 
Supp. 3d at 481–82; Bleiler v. Coll. of the Holy Cross, No. CIV.A. 11-11541-DJC, 2013 WL 
4714340, at *15 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2013), appeal dismissed, No. 13-2245 (1st Cir. Apr. 8, 
2015) (stating that Massachusetts law recognizes that student handbooks and other college 
materials create a contract between a school and a student). But see Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 
WL 4647996, at *11 (“Courts applying Virginia law routinely reject the notion that a 
‘Student Handbook’ creates a mutuality of engagement where the terms of the handbook are 
subject to change.”).  However, these claims have been relatively unsuccessful, as in many 
cases “the issue is that a university’s procedures were unfair, not that they were ignored—
and unfairness itself does not generally create a breach of contract claim where the college 
has followed its own procedures.” Harris, supra note 183, at 7; see also Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 
481–82; Bleiler, 2013 WL 4714340, at *14–17 (finding that a contract existed, but the 
school adequately followed its procedures and therefore did not breach its contract to the 
student). 
 213. Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 464 (quoting Johnson v. Temple Univ.—of Commonwealth 
Sys. of Higher Educ., No. CIV. A. 12-515, 2013 WL 5298484, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 
2013)). 
 214. See, e.g., id. at 463–64; Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-
CV-209, 2015 WL 5553855, at *16 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff 
satisfied the first prong of the Yusuf analysis by alleging that the school’s procedure was 
flawed based on its “failure to provide a neutral arbiter without prior involvement in the 
case”). 
 215. See Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 466 (holding that allowing the Title IX investigator to 
testify was not a flaw in the school’s disciplinary proceeding); see also Doe v. Columbia 
Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1661 (2d Cir. 
May 21, 2015).  The court in Yu noted that, perhaps if the defendant were a public school, 
the plaintiff would have a valid due process claim because the Due Process Clause 
guarantees the separation of the roles of prosecutor, witness, and judge. Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 
466 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927)). 
 216. See Sahm v. Miami Univ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 774, 778–79 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (finding 
the Title IX investigator’s “discourag[ing] a witness from testifying at the disciplinary 
hearing . . . troubling”); Wells v. Xavier Univ., 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 217. See George Mason Univ., 2015 WL 5553855, at *16 (noting that the tribunal’s 
“failure to consider witness statements” along with other alleged flaws satisfies the first 
prong of the Yusuf analysis); see also Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at *10; Doe v. 
Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. CV 14-30143-MGM, 2015 WL 4306521, at *8 (D. Mass. July 
14, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-01856 (1st Cir. July 28, 2015). 
 218. See, e.g., Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *8 (noting that the 
plaintiff’s “difficulties getting information” with respect to his case together with other 
alleged flaws “are sufficient to raise at least some questions about the outcome of his 
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Courts also evaluate whether schools provide accused students the 
opportunity to question witnesses.220  However, requiring that students 
submit questions for panel members to ask does not give rise to a fatal 
procedural flaw.221  This is especially true as the OCR in the “Dear 
Colleague” letter “strongly discourage[d] schools from allowing the parties 
personally to question or cross-examine each other during the hearing.”222  
However, a panel not allowing a party to ask particular questions could be 
considered a procedural flaw if omitting those questions plausibly led to the 
tribunal’s erroneous outcome.223 
Few courts have evaluated the “Dear Colleague” letter’s mandate that 
schools use a preponderance of the evidence standard in disciplinary 
proceedings.224  In Yu v. Vassar College,225 the court evaluated the 
plaintiff’s argument that the disciplinary panel replaced the preponderance 
of the evidence standard with a presumption of male guilt, but did not speak 
directly to the implementation or application of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.226  The court in Doe v. University of Massachusetts-
Amherst227 similarly acknowledged the school’s use of the preponderance 
of the evidence standard in campus disciplinary proceedings and noted that 
use of the lowest standard of proof “tip[s] the scale in favor of the 
complainant in cases where testimony from both parties is credible.”228 
In sum, courts acknowledge that certain disciplinary proceedings are 
fundamentally flawed.  However, courts typically dismiss these same 
claims because of the difficulty in proving a causal link between the alleged 
erroneous outcome and the student’s gender.229  The frequency with which 
plaintiffs are able to satisfy the first Yusuf prong, however, emphasizes the 
 
disciplinary proceeding”); see also Doe v. Salisbury Univ., No. JKB-15-517, 2015 WL 
5005811, at *13 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2015) (“SU barred [p]laintiffs from reviewing witness 
statements and the list of witnesses prior to the hearing, and failed to provide [p]laintiffs with 
all evidence that was to be presented to the Board.”). 
 219. See Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at *10 (noting that “critical omissions” 
by school investigators in witness summaries contributed to a finding that the disciplinary 
proceedings were flawed); Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *8 (noting that 
“the misuse of witness testimony by the hearing board” contributed to a finding that the 
disciplinary proceedings were flawed); see also Salisbury, 2015 WL 5005811, at *13. 
 220. See, e.g., Salisbury, 2015 WL 5005811, at *13 (noting that the plaintiff was not 
permitted to ask witnesses particular questions); Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, 
at *8  (noting that “limits placed on [the plaintiff’s] ability to cross-examine witnesses” 
together with other procedural flaws were “sufficient to raise at least some questions about 
the outcome of his disciplinary proceeding”). 
 221. See Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 222. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 12. 
 223. See Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 465–66. 
 224. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 10–11. 
 225. 97 F. Supp. 3d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 226. Id. at 469–71. 
 227. No. 14-30143-MGM, 2015 WL 4306521 (D. Mass. July 14, 2015), appeal docketed, 
No. 15-01856 (1st Cir. July 28, 2015). 
 228. Id. at *7. 
 229. See, e.g., Sahm v. Miami Univ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 774, 778–79 (S.D. Ohio 2015) 
(noting that while the alleged flaw in the proceedings was “troubling,” the facts did not 
“suggest a gender bias against males so much as against students accused of sexual assault”). 
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flawed nature of school sexual assault tribunals and highlights the need for 
procedural reform. 
b.  The Second Prong:  Discriminatory Intent 
Students have had difficulty effectively pleading discriminatory intent, 
and courts have not been consistent with respect to what is necessary at the 
pleadings stage for a Title IX erroneous outcome claim to survive a motion 
to dismiss.  In most cases, absent “statements by members of the 
disciplinary tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns 
of decision-making that also tend to show the influence of gender,” a court 
will dismiss a plaintiff’s claim.230 
In several cases, accused students have argued that their schools 
exploited them as “scapegoats” to demonstrate to the OCR that the school 
appropriately handles sexual assault accusations, which evidences 
discriminatory intent.231  Similarly, students have argued that their schools 
have systematically and erroneously found males responsible for sexual 
assault to ward off negative media attention.232  Courts are divided as to 
whether this allegation weighs in favor of finding that the school’s policies 
were gender biased, at least with respect to evaluating whether a plaintiff’s 
claim should survive a motion to dismiss.233 
In Wells v. Xavier University,234 the court accepted this allegation as 
plausibly evidencing a school’s gender bias.235  Because the school 
conducted an “unfair hearing” that the plaintiff alleged was motivated by 
the school’s attempt to demonstrate to the OCR that it was adequately 
handling sexual assault accusations, the student’s claim survived the motion 
to dismiss.236  The plaintiff contended that the school “had a pattern of 
decision-making that . . . ultimately resulted in an alleged false outcome 
that he was guilty of rape.”237  The court noted that additional evidence of 
this pattern would ultimately be necessary, but that the allegation in and of 
itself was sufficient at the pleading stage.238  Similarly, the court in Sahm v. 
 
 230. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 231. See, e.g., Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-CV-209, 2015 
WL 5553855, at *16 n.27 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2015); Doe v. Salisbury Univ., No. JKB-15-
517, 2015 WL 5005811, at *14 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2015); Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 
6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *9–10 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015); Univ. of Mass.-
Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *8–9; Sahm, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 779; Wells v. Xavier Univ., 
7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 747, 751 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 
368–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1661 (2d Cir. May 21, 2015). 
 232. See, e.g., Salisbury, 2015 WL 5005811, at *14; Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 
4306521, at *9; Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d at 368–69. 
 233. Compare Salisbury, 2015 WL 5005811, at *13, Wash. & Lee Univ., 2015 WL 
4647996, at *10, Sahm, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 778–79, and Wells, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 751, with 
George Mason Univ., 2015 WL 5553855, at *16, and Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d at 
370. 
 234. 7 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 235. See id. at 751. 
 236. Id. at 748, 751. 
 237. Id. at 751. 
 238. See id. 
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Miami University,239 while dismissing the student’s claim on other grounds, 
noted that allegations that the school “react[ed] against [the plaintiff], as a 
male, to demonstrate to the OCR that [the school] would take action, as [it] 
had failed to in the past, against males accused of sexual assault” is a claim 
“sufficient to state an erroneous outcome Title IX claim.”240 
The court in Doe v. Columbia University241 declined to follow the 
reasoning in Wells, finding that simply stating that a pattern exists without 
pleading particular facts that demonstrate that pattern amounts to a 
“subjective belief, devoid of factual support” and does not satisfy the 
Twombly and Iqbal pleadings standards.242  In Columbia, the plaintiff’s 
complaint included allegations qualified with the statement “upon 
information and belief” and included claims of gender bias deemed to be 
conclusory.243  The court found the complaint inadequate because a 
“[p]laintiff’s subjective belief that he was the victim of discrimination—
however strongly felt—is insufficient to satisfy his burden at the pleading 
stage.”244  The court emphasized that plaintiffs must demonstrate that 
gender was a “motivating factor” in the school’s decision, stating: 
[W]hile Columbia may well have treated [the complainant] more 
favorably than [p]laintiff during the disciplinary process, the mere fact 
that [p]laintiff is male and [the complainant] is female does not suggest 
that the disparate treatment was because of [p]laintiff’s sex.  Indeed, the 
alleged treatment “could equally have been”—and more plausibly was—
“prompted by lawful, independent goals,” such as a desire (enhanced, 
perhaps, by the fear of negative publicity or Title IX liability to the 
victims of sexual assault) to take allegations of rape on campus seriously 
and to treat complainants with a high degree of sensitivity.245 
Therefore, under Columbia, even if a school demonstrates a systematic 
pattern of unfairly and erroneously finding males accused of sexual assault 
responsible, unless the student can plead particular facts (such as statements 
by school officials or tribunal members, or data demonstrating a pattern of 
gender bias) to demonstrate that these unsound procedures are unfair 
because the accused students are male, the claim will not survive a motion 
to dismiss.246  Further, acting in response to the national media attention 
 
 239. 110 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D. Ohio 2015). 
 240. Id. at 779 (quoting Wells, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 751). 
 241. 101 F. Supp. 3d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1661 (2d Cir. May 
21, 2015). 
 242. Id. at 374.  The court in Tanyi v. Appalachian State University similarly declined to 
follow Wells. See No. 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853, at *10 (W.D.N.C. July 22, 
2015) (“[A]s the Southern District of New York noted in Doe, ‘that sort of subjective belief, 
devoid of factual support, is plainly insufficient after Iqbal and Twombly.’  Accordingly, the 
Court declines to follow the Wells ruling.” (quoting Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d at 
373)). 
 243. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d at 370–71. 
 244. Id. at 371. 
 245. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)). 
 246. Id. 
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placed on college campuses is a “lawful, independent goal” that does not 
warrant the court’s review.247 
Subsequent cases have adopted the reasoning in Columbia and dismissed 
students’ gender discrimination claims, creating a high bar for proving 
gender discrimination.248  The court in Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George 
Mason University249 added that there could be many “less admirable—but 
still non-discriminatory—explanations for [the school’s] decision, such as a 
lack of common sense,” but that without facts sufficient to make “gender-
motivated discrimination” plausible, not just conceivable, the student’s 
claim must fail.250 
Recently, two cases provided examples as to what additional facts are 
necessary at the pleading stage for a court to allow a student’s claim to 
survive a motion to dismiss.251  In Doe v. Washington & Lee University,252 
the court denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss holding that the school’s 
alleged flawed procedures, “at least when it comes to charges of sexual 
misconduct, amount[ed] to ‘a practice of railroading accused students.’”253  
Allegations of this practice stemming from “pressure from the government 
to convict male students of sexual assault” coupled with an article written 
by the Title IX investigator, who had considerable influence during the 
proceedings, evidencing her gender bias rendered the claim sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.254 
Similarly, in Doe v. Salisbury University,255 the court found that 
allegations of government pressure to convict males accused of sexual 
assault coupled with additional allegations of gender bias were sufficient to 
establish an erroneous outcome discrimination claim.256  The court in 
Salisbury seems to have lowered the bar with respect to what constitutes 
these additional allegations by recognizing that obtaining communications 
demonstrating a school’s gender bias may require discovery.257  The court 
 
 247. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). 
 248. See Doe v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. 14-30143-MGM, 2015 WL 4306521, at 
*8–9 (D. Mass. July 14, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-01856 (1st Cir. July 28, 2015) 
(holding that pressure from the media and OCR do not evidence a school’s gender bias 
without additional “comments that [the school] targeted [the accused student] based on his 
gender,” “conduct suggestive of gender bias,” or some type of “data or credible anecdotal 
references” that demonstrate a pattern of invariably finding males guilty of sexual assault 
because of their sex); see also Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-
CV-209, 2015 WL 5553855, at *16 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2015); Tanyi v. Appalachian State 
Univ., No. 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853, at *10 (W.D.N.C. July 22, 2015). 
 249. No. 1:15-CV-209, 2015 WL 5553855 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2015). 
 250. Id. at *16–17. 
 251. See Doe v. Salisbury Univ., No. JKB-15-517, 2015 WL 5005811 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 
2015); Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-cv-00052, 2015 WL 4647996 (W.D. Va. Aug. 
5, 2015). 
 252. No. 6:14-cv-00052, 2015 WL 4647996 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015). 
 253. Id. at *10 (quoting Haley v. Va. Com. Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 
1996)). 
 254. Id. 
 255. No. JKB-15-517, 2015 WL 5005811 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2015). 
 256. Id. at *14–15. 
 257. Id. at *15 (“While these crucial allegations are all based solely ‘upon information 
and belief,’ this is a permissible way to indicate a factual connection that a plaintiff 
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held that allegations couched with the phrase “upon information and belief” 
that refer to specific facts that if obtained through discovery would evidence 
gender bias are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.258  Therefore, 
allegations that schools are invariably finding male students accused of 
sexual assault culpable as a result of pressure from the DOE and a desire to 
avoid negative publicity, together with “specific factual allegations,” 
plausibly support claims of intentional gender discrimination and render an 
accused student’s Title IX erroneous outcome claim valid.259 
In sum, although few of these cases have survived the pleadings stage, 
they highlight important issues with respect to investigations and 
adjudications of sexual assault on college campuses.  First, although the 
second Yusuf prong is often difficult for plaintiffs to meet, the first Yusuf 
prong—demonstrating that disciplinary procedures are flawed and have led 
to an erroneous outcome—has not been difficult to satisfy.  As such, courts 
have not hesitated to point out that many of these campus sexual assault 
tribunals are fundamentally flawed, thereby leading to erroneous outcomes.  
Additionally, in evaluating the second Yusuf prong, courts’ assessment of 
plaintiffs’ allegations that schools are railroading them is probative of the 
fundamental fairness of these procedures.  Although courts have dismissed 
many of these claims, they have acknowledged that pressure from the 
government has motivated schools to implement policies that “amount to ‘a 
practice of railroading accused students’”260 and are characterized by a 
 
reasonably believes is true but for which the plaintiff may need discovery to gather and 
confirm its evidentiary basis.”). 
 258. Salisbury, 2015 WL 5005811, at *14.  This is contrary to the court’s holding in Doe 
v. Columbia University, which dismissed the student’s claims regarding gender 
discrimination indicating that the use of “upon information and belief” merely underscores 
the absence of particularized evidence supporting an inference that gender bias was causally 
linked to a flawed outcome. See 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 370–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-1661 (2d Cir. May 21, 2015).  However, the three “crucial allegations” to 
which the court refers in Salisbury include, by contrast to the allegations in Columbia 
University, “specific factual allegations.” Compare Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d at 370–
74, with Salisbury, 2015 WL 5005811, at *15.  The three allegations include:  (1)  “[u]pon 
information and belief, SU possesses communications evidencing [d]efendants’ deliberate 
indifference in imposing wrongful discipline on [p]laintiffs on the basis of their gender,” (2)  
“[u]pon information and belief, SU possesses communications evidencing SU’s intent to 
favor female students alleging sexual assault over male students like [p]laintiffs who are 
accused of sexual assault,” and (3)  “upon information and belief . . . [d]efendants’ deliberate 
indifference was taken to demonstrate to the United States Department of Education and/or 
the general public that [d]efendants are aggressively disciplining male students accused of 
sexual assault.” Id. at *14 (citation omitted).  The court noted, however, that “[p]laintiffs’ 
erroneous outcome allegations would be insufficient if they had simply stated something 
akin to:  ‘Upon information and belief, procedural defects were motivated by gender bias.’” 
Id. at *15.  Thus, because these claims allude to specific communications, or facts that are 
“peculiarly within the possession or control of SU [d]efendants,” they are not simply 
conclusory statements and are sufficient to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-cv-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *10 (W.D. 
Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (quoting Haley v. Va. Com. Univ., 948 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 
1996)). 
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“lack of common sense.”261  Taken together, this suggests the need for 
additional due process protections for the accused. 
Further, because many of these claims do not survive the schools’ 
motions to dismiss, students who erroneously have been found responsible 
for sexual assault do not have the opportunity for meaningful judicial 
review.  Despite the courts’ recognition of the procedurally flawed tribunals 
and acknowledgement that students have been wrongly suspended or 
expelled from school, accused students are unable to obtain relief from the 
courts solely by demonstrating their schools’ rush to judgment.  
Considering the inherently flawed nature of these campus tribunals and the 
consequences that students dismissed from their colleges face,262 the 
opportunity for judicial review of school tribunals is warranted. 
3.  Case Implications 
Students found responsible for sexual assault on college campuses 
because of flawed proceedings are increasingly bringing their cases to 
court.263  The requirements of the “Dear Colleague” letter “put[] enormous 
pressure on the school to maintain a victim-friendly environment, which 
can end up creating an environment that is less sympathetic to the accused 
and tilted in favor of the alleged victim.”264  The cases discussed in the two 
previous sections demonstrate that schools, in an attempt to comply with 
the Title IX mandates, have overcorrected past issues that plagued campus 
disciplinary procedures and have established fundamentally flawed 
procedures that lack even minimal due process protections for accused 
students.  Many commentators agree.265  The recent reversals of decisions 
of campus sexual assault tribunals signal to some the beginning of 
important recognition from courts that schools have gone too far in an 
 
 261. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-CV-209, 2015 WL 
5553855, at *16 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2015). 
 262. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 263. See Due Process Database, supra note 147. 
 264. Alexandra Fries, Note, Student-On-Student Sexual Assault Policy:  How a Victim-
Centered Approach Harms Men:  A Close-Up on Notre Dame’s Changes to Its Student 
Handbook, 39 J.C. & U.L. 633, 645 (2013); see also Judith Shulevitz, Accused College 
Rapists Have Rights, Too:  The Victims Deserve Justice.  The Men Deserve Due Process, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 11, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119778/college-sexual-
assault-rules-trample-rights-accused-campus-rapists [https://perma.cc/8BWT-P7B8]; FIRE 
Letter to Office for Civil Rights Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn Ali, May 5, 
2011, FIRE (May 5, 2011), http://thefire.org/article/13142.html [https://perma.cc/NKF4-
THEF]. 
 265. See, e.g., Sevilla, supra note 83, at 16 (“Cases challenging administrative expulsions 
from school are now percolating into state and federal courts, and as they do, the courts are 
finding the treatment of the accused appalling.”); Yoffe, supra note 15. See generally Harris, 
supra note 183; Press Release, Stop Abusive and Violent Environments, Four Rulings, Four 
Reversals:  Judges Give ‘Thumbs Down’ on Campus Sex Tribunals (Aug. 25, 2015), 
http://www.saveservices.org/2015/08/pr-four-rulings-four-reversals-judges-give-thumbs-
down-on-campus-sex-tribunals/ [https://perma.cc/V79C-QN76]. 
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attempt to comply with Title IX and have created victim-friendly policies 
and procedures that are unfairly stacked against the accused.266 
Many argue that the reason these policies and procedures have been 
described as “appalling” is the Title IX guidance, which has unfairly tipped 
the scales in favor of the accusers267 and has thus created a system that 
presumes the accused guilty at the outset.268  Commentators argue that this 
presumption is a result of monetary pressure on schools from the federal 
government to take sexual assault seriously.269  Notably, the nineteen-page 
“Dear Colleague” letter only includes two sentences that address the rights 
of the accused.270  The importance of the rights of the accused to the OCR, 
according to critics, is “unmistakable” and “implies, ‘oddly and ominously, 
that the statutory rights of the accuser trump the constitutional due-process 
[sic] rights of the accused.’”271 
 
 266. See, e.g., Sevilla, supra note 83, at 19 (“Indeed, recent cases show colleges have no 
idea how to fairly implement Title IX, and instead have created made-up, arbitrary 
procedures without due process guarantees of timely notice, confrontation, and a fair 
hearing.”); Teresa Watanabe, Ruling in Favor of UC Student Accused of Sex Assault Could 
Ripple Across U.S., L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-
me-ucsd-male-student-20150715-story.html (discussing the potential impact of Doe v. 
Regents of the University of California San Diego) [https://perma.cc/QF2Z-VZUE]; Tovia 
Smith, For Students Accused of Campus Rape, Legal Victories Win Back Rights, NPR (Oct. 
15, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/15/446083439/for-students-accused-of-campus-rape-
legal-victories-win-back-rights [https://perma.cc/64Y6-5C49]; Stop Abusive and Violent 
Environments, supra note 265. 
 267. See, e.g., Henrick, supra note 41, at 54 (arguing that “the process of resolving sexual 
misconduct allegations under Title IX is fundamentally unfair to the accused and unduly 
prone to false convictions”); Ellis, supra note 133, at 76; Shulevitz, supra note 264. 
 268. See Yoffe, supra note 15 (“Unfortunately, under the worthy mandate of protecting 
victims of sexual assault, procedures are being put in place at colleges that presume the guilt 
of the accused.  Colleges, encouraged by federal officials, are instituting solutions to sexual 
violence against women that abrogate the civil rights of men.”); see also Henrick, supra note 
41, at 59; Sevilla, supra note 83, at 17; Peter Berkowitz, Commentary, College Rape 
Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 20, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903596904576516232905230642 [https:// 
perma.cc/D8PU-HWGM]. 
 269. See Janet Halley, Comment, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX 
Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103, 106 (2015) (discussing the “pressure on schools to 
hold students responsible for serious harm even when—precisely when—there can be no 
certainty about who is to blame for it”); Conor Friedersdorf, How Sexual-Harassment 
Policies Are Diminishing Academic Freedom, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2015), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/sexual-harassment-academic-freedom/ 
411427/ (“By threatening to pull federal funds, the OCR has forced schools, even well-
endowed schools like Harvard, to adopt sexual misconduct policies that violate many civil 
liberties.”) [https://perma.cc/R4XZ-3EHK]; see also Sevilla, supra note 83, at 19 (“Colleges 
and universities are already strapped for funding.  The force of [language threatening the 
withholding of state and federal funding], the pressures exerted by state and federal 
governments, and the unilateral focus on ‘victim’ rights creates hydraulic pressure on 
schools to satisfy their funding masters.  The resulting conviction-producing machinery is a 
sad contradiction to the due process tradition of individualized justice.”). 
 270. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 271. Henrick, supra note 41, at 62 (quoting Wendy Kaminer, Sexual Harassment and the 
Loneliness of Civil Libertarian Feminist, ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2011), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/04/sexual-harassment-and-the-loneliness-of-the-
civil-libertarian-feminist/236887/ [https://perma.cc/PX56-LZF3]). 
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As a result, commentators have argued for implementation of additional 
due process protections for the accused, including the rights to adequate 
notice of the charges and evidence against the accused,272 to an impartial 
hearing,273 to confront and cross-examine witnesses,274 and to counsel.275  
Both Harvard University and University of Pennsylvania law professors 
have written open letters to the OCR expressing their concerns that the 
polices their respective schools have adopted in an attempt to comply with 
the OCR guidance “lack the most basic elements of fairness and due 
process [and] are overwhelmingly stacked against the accused.”276  
Specifically, they have rebuked “[t]he absence of any adequate opportunity 
to . . . confront witnesses and present a defense at an adversary hearing,”277 
the denial of legal representation for the accused,278 and the conflict of 
interest presented by Title IX investigators playing multiple roles in sexual 
assault investigations and adjudications.279  The Harvard Law professors 
also have taken issue with Harvard’s broad definition of sexual violence, 
arguing that it is “starkly one-sided as between complainants and 
respondents, and entirely inadequate to address the complex issues in these 
unfortunate situations involving extreme use and abuse of alcohol and 
drugs.”280 
 
 272. See Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 687–88. 
 273. See id. at 688–89. 
 274. See id. at 690; see also Hendrix, supra note 133, at 615–18; Triplett, supra note 43, 
at 520.  The right to confront is particularly important in sexual assault cases as they 
typically rely on credibility determinations. See Swem, supra note 131, at 376–77; 
Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 690. 
 275. See Groholski, supra note 127, at 782–96; Tenerowicz, supra note 124, at 691. 
 276. Bartholet et al., supra note 100; see also Volokh, supra note 100 (“[P]articularly in 
light of the financial sanctions threatened by OCR, we believe that OCR’s approach exerts 
improper pressure upon universities to adopt procedures that do not afford fundamental 
fairness.  We do not believe that providing justice for victims of sexual assault requires 
subordinating so many protections long deemed necessary to protect from injustice those 
accused of serious offenses.”). 
 277. Bartholet et al., supra note 100; see also Volokh, supra note 100 (“Cross-
examination has long been considered as perhaps the most important procedure in reaching a 
fair and reliable determination of disputed facts.”). 
 278. See Bartholet et al., supra note 100 (stating that Harvard’s policy is unfair in part 
because of its “failure to ensure adequate representation for the accused, particularly for 
students unable to afford representation”). 
 279. See id. (stating that “[t]he lodging of the functions of investigation, prosecution, fact-
finding, and appellate review in one office, and the fact that that office is itself a Title IX 
compliance office rather than an entity that could be considered structurally impartial” is 
fundamentally unfair). 
 280. See id.; see also Halley, supra note 269, at 112–14 (arguing that Harvard’s policy, 
which renders sexual conduct between impaired or incapacitated students punishable, is too 
broad because it does not properly govern the hard cases—the cases in which both the 
accuser and the accused were “willingly drinking heavily and using powerful drugs” and 
creates a “per se rule in favor of the complainant and an irrebutable presumption against the 
respondent”).  Janet Halley describes such a rule as creating “the steep asymmetry between 
the consequences of drinking and drug use for the complainant and for the respondent:  for 
the former, intoxication is, to one degree or another, the basis for a per se finding of 
unwantedness even when assent—even when consent—has been given; but for the latter, it 
has no mitigating effect on his conduct.” Id. at 113.  In fact, a debate exists with respect to 
how to craft policies that address appropriately the typical campus sexual assault situation, 
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Other commentators have agreed, such as Janet Halley, a Harvard Law 
professor who raised similar concerns in her statement before a hearing of 
the U.S. Senate’s Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee.281  
Professor Halley advocated for additional due process protections for the 
accused, including adequate notice and the opportunity for the accused to 
review the complaint and all material evidence,282 the right to a fair hearing 
with the right to confront,283 and unbiased investigators and adjudicators.284 
Some commentators, however, disagree, including Caroline Heldman, a 
professor at Occidental College and cofounder of End Rape on Campus, 
who stated that “[t]hese lawsuits are an incredible display of entitlement, 
the same entitlement that drove them to rape.”285  Even if these procedures 
are stacked in favor of accusers, many argue that this victim-centered 
approach appropriately protects the important rights and needs of the 
accusers over those of the accused, and thus no additional due process 
 
which some argue consists of cases in which both parties are intoxicated and others argue are 
instances of target rape.  Professor Diane Rosenfeld argues that the “miscommunication” 
cases that Professor Halley categorizes as the hard cases which render Harvard’s policy 
problematic are not the norm. See Rosenfeld, supra note 125, at 371–78.  Instead, she argues 
that campus sexual assault is primarily deliberate targeting, where “students who commit 
campus rape act in intentional, premeditated, and predatory ways.” Id. at 372; see also David 
Lisak, Understanding the Predatory Nature of Sexual Violence, 14 SEXUAL ASSAULT REP. 
49, 49–50 (2011). 
 281. Reauthorizing the Higher Education Act:  Combatting Sexual Assault:  Hearing on 
S. 590 Before the S. Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) 
(statement of Janet Halley, Royall Prof. of Law, Harvard Law Sch.) [hereinafter Halley 
Statement]. 
 282. See Halley Statement, supra note 281, at 2 (“College and university procedures often 
tilt the process unfairly [against the accused] . . . .  The accused have no right to see the 
complaint.  This is fundamental to due process no matter how narrowly conceived.”). 
 283. Id. (“Even when there is a hearing, proper concern for the well-being of 
complainants has led to unfair restraints on the right of the accused to probe evidence and 
ask questions.”). 
 284. See id. (describing the use of Title IX officers to fill multiple roles during an 
investigation as “lack[ing] neutrality and independence and . . . inherently biased”).  Halley 
similarly stated that “[m]any rightly perceive this process to be unfair:  far from vindicating 
our values, this squanders the legitimacy of a vital enterprise.  Minimal due process requires 
truly independent and neutral decision-makers, separated by function to provide 
accountability.” Id.; see also Halley, supra note 269, at 107–08. 
 285. Yoffe, supra note 15; see also Emily Shugerman, Men Sue in Campus Sexual 
Assault Cases, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG (June 18, 2014), http://msmagazine.com/blog/ 
2014/06/18/men-sue-in-campus-sexual-assault-cases/ (quoting Professor Caroline Heldman 
discussing these recent lawsuits as stating that “[t]hese are students who were found 
responsible after an extensive adjudication proceeding that is heavily biased in favor of 
alleged perpetrators”) [https://perma.cc/75Z7-6MH3].  Professor Heldman also stated that 
“[w]e don’t have a problem with false rape reporting, we have a problem with rapes not 
being reported, a problem with adjudications that favor perpetrators when they are reported 
and a problem with light sanctions when a student has been found responsible for 
assault/rape.” Id.; see also Sevilla, supra note 83, at 19 n.22 (describing John Krakauer’s 
new book, Missoula, which argues for “a mandatory belief by police in the truth of the 
complaining witness’s accusation unless otherwise proven false” because the small number 
of false rape accusations “are buried in continual assertions that almost all sexual assault 
complaints are true and that the university and criminal law systems have not taken such 
charges seriously”). 
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protections are warranted.286  For example, Nancy Chi Cantalupo argues 
that during the hearing stage, the procedures should be tailored toward 
protecting the alleged victim.287  Because facing the accused can subject the 
alleged victim to additional trauma, those that favor a victim-centered 
approach argue against cross-examination.288  However, in light of recent 
case law evidencing the flawed nature of campus procedures, additional due 
process protections for the accused are necessary in campus sexual assault 
proceedings.289 
III.  THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND ADDITIONAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
FOR THE ACCUSED IN LIGHT OF RECENT JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
Additional due process protections should be implemented in school 
sexual assault policies and procedures in light of the recent cases discussed 
in Part II.  The prevalence of sexual assault on college campuses is 
unjustifiably high.  Although colleges have made progress to reform their 
procedures to protect victims and hold perpetrators responsible, they must 
do more.  However, it is important that schools do not adopt policies that 
are fundamentally unfair to the accused.  Recent cases demonstrate that 
many schools have overcorrected by conducting investigations and 
adjudications that deny accused students fundamentally fair proceedings.  A 
lack of fairness and due process “threaten[s] the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the important progress [schools] have made.”290  As such, this 
 
 286. See supra note 125 and accompanying text; see also Laura L. Dunn, Addressing 
Sexual Violence in Higher Education:  Ensuring Compliance with the Clery Act, Title IX and 
VAWA, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 578–84 (2014); Rosenfeld, supra note 125, at 364, 369; 
Ashe Schow, Campus Sexual Assault Hearing Applauds Witch-Hunt Mentality, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/campus-sexual-assault-
hearing-applauds-witch-hunt-mentality/article/2571784 (describing how Colorado 
Representative Jared Polis received a round of applause at a congressional hearing after he 
“suggested that expelling students based solely on the idea that they might have committed a 
crime is an acceptable standard”) [https://perma.cc/6K87-449E]. 
 287. See Cantalupo, Campus Violence, supra note 125, at 669–71, 680–88. 
 288. Id. at 683–84 (discussing the effects of cross-examination on a victim, stating that 
“requiring a student survivor to present her own case and allowing her accused assailant to 
cross-examine her, even through the hearing board, may actually perpetuate a hostile 
environment”). 
 289. The problems with the current system have led some to argue that schools should 
refer all sexual assault allegations to law enforcement. See supra note 41 and accompanying 
text.  While law enforcement should be involved if the accuser wishes, this proposition 
ignores the mandate of schools to take action under Title IX. See supra notes 62–63 and 
accompanying text.  Mandatory reporting to police would also likely decrease the number of 
reported sexual assaults, which is already low. See Edwards, supra note 123, at 139; 
Alexandra Brodsky & Elizabeth Deutsch, No, We Can’t Just Leave College Sexual Assault 
to the Police, POLITICO (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/ 
12/uva-sexual-assault-campus-113294.html#.VP4ASr7i7wx [https://perma.cc/8WVX-
2TW4]; see also supra note 34.  Further, this proposition ignores the important role that 
schools play in protecting the victim and the small number of rapes that are actually 
prosecuted after being referred to law enforcement.  Therefore, this Note argues for reforms 
to the current on-campus adjudication system in the form of more meaningful judicial review 
and additional due process protections for the accused. 
 290. Halley Statement, supra note 281, at 1. 
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part advocates for more meaningful judicial review and additional due 
process protections for the accused, similar to those proposed in the Fair 
Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act.291 
A.  Judicial Review 
Students who allege they have been erroneously expelled as a result of 
on-campus adjudicative processes are increasingly bringing claims against 
their schools.292  In both the private and public school contexts, courts 
generally have been reluctant to overturn a school’s decision to expel or 
suspend students who have been accused of sexual assault.  However, some 
courts have begun to recognize unfairness in these proceedings.  Two courts 
have recently overturned public schools’ findings where students asserted 
due process claims.293  The willingness of these courts to review the 
schools’ decisions and recognize the unfairness of the procedures should 
serve as an example for future courts when evaluating the accused’s due 
process claims. 
In the context of private schools, courts have dismissed the majority of 
cases at the pleadings stage, because there exists no equivalent due process 
claim for students attending nonpublic institutions.294  If a student at a 
private university believes he or she has been wrongly found responsible for 
sexual assault, absent evidence very difficult to obtain prior to discovery 
demonstrating that the school intentionally discriminated against the student 
on the basis of gender—such as “statements by members of the disciplinary 
tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-
making that also tend to show the influence of gender”—the accused 
student has no opportunity for judicial review.295  Because courts have 
acknowledged that these proceedings in many cases are fundamentally 
flawed296 and that suspension or expulsion can have life-long negative 
consequences for students upon whom a penalty is imposed,297 courts 
should permit these complaints to at least survive the pleadings stage. 
The threat of such cases proceeding to discovery, and the associated cost 
of litigating such claims, will likely incentivize schools to employ fairer 
proceedings when investigating and adjudicating sexual assault claims.  It 
may also induce settlement.298  While full remedy and reversal of a school’s 
 
 291. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 292. See supra Part II.B; see also supra note 147. 
 293. See supra notes 165–82 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 295. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994); see also supra Part II.B.2.b.  
In addition to Title IX claims, students also can sue their schools for breach of contract, see 
supra note 212, and in tort. See, e.g., Doe v. Salisbury Univ., No. JKB-15-517, 2015 WL 
5005811, at *8–10 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2015).  However, these cases have largely been 
unsuccessful and do not provide a meaningful alternative for wrongfully accused students. 
See Henrick, supra note 41, at 78.  Given the unsuccessful nature of these suits and the 
recent trend of students bringing Title IX claims against their schools, further discussion of 
these alternative claims are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 296. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 297. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 298. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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decision is the ultimate goal for the wrongly accused, settlement 
opportunities may provide some relief. 
However, for now, although many on-campus procedures are 
substantially flawed, it remains difficult for wrongly accused students to 
meet the second Yusuf prong.299  The court’s analysis of the first Yusuf 
prong should inform its analysis of the second Yusuf prong so fewer 
wrongfully accused students are denied their day in court.  Specifically, 
courts should consider accused students’ “scapegoat” arguments together 
with the flawed nature of the university’s proceedings to satisfy the Yusuf 
standard as the courts did in Wells,300 Sahm,301 Washington & Lee,302 and 
Salisbury.303  At the pleadings stage, plaintiffs’ arguments that school 
procedures amount to railroading the accused through systematically 
expelling students accused of sexual assault in response to government and 
media pressure should render a claim sufficiently plausible to survive a 
motion to dismiss.304  As the court recognized in Salisbury, discovery is 
necessary to gather evidence to support this type of allegation.305 
Even if courts continue to grant schools’ motions to dismiss in due 
process and Title IX cases, courts should similarly continue to acknowledge 
the flawed nature of the proceedings to encourage and influence the reform 
of school procedures.306  However, learning retroactively from judicial 
rulings cannot suffice as a permanent solution, because such opinions come 
at the expense of innocent and wrongfully convicted students.307  Instead, 
judicial review in this capacity should function as an interim check on 
schools, with the expectation that future reform will eliminate, or at least 
diminish, the need for the judiciary’s role. 
Because the interests at stake are so high,308 eventual reform should 
include creating a private right of action for students who believe they 
wrongfully have been expelled or suspended from either a private or public 
 
 299. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 300. See supra notes 236–38 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 256–59 and accompanying text. 
 304. This was the argument that many of the plaintiffs made in the cases discussed above, 
see supra Part II.B.2.b, and is the argument that the appellant student is making in the 
pending appeal of Doe v. Columbia University, 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 
appeal docketed, No. 15-1661 (2d Cir. May 21, 2015). See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee at 39–41, Columbia Univ., No. 15-1536 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2015).  This 
argument should at least satisfy the second Yusuf prong at the pleadings stage to allow 
plaintiffs to gather information that may shed light on the school’s motivation or intent for 
dismissing the student, as the specificity with which the court has demanded facts be pleaded 
in the complaint is difficult without discovery. 
 305. See supra notes 256–59 and accompanying text. 
 306. See Sevilla, supra note 83, at 18–19 (“[R]ecent cases show colleges have no idea 
how to fairly implement Title IX, and instead have created made-up, arbitrary procedures 
without due process guarantees,” but “[h]opefully, judicial rulings will teach these educators 
a valuable lesson”). 
 307. Charles Sevilla expressed a similar sentiment, stating that “[a]s these campus cases 
continue to move into the state and federal courts, schools will learn the way, but at the 
expense of how many falsely branded young people?” Sevilla, supra note 83, at 19. 
 308. See supra Part II.A. 
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school.  The Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act provide for judicial 
review of campus disciplinary proceedings, establishing a federal private 
right of action for aggrieved students.309  The standard of review would be 
deferential to schools, requiring courts to consider whether the school acted 
in a manner that was “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.”310  
Congress should adopt such a provision.  Although it is not typically a 
court’s role to meddle in the administrative workings and decisions of 
schools,311 judicial review acts as a necessary check on a school’s 
independent adjudication of a crime that carries serious consequences for all 
parties involved.312  Without this safeguard, schools will maintain unbridled 
discretion to trample on students’ due process rights and to deny them an 
education. 
The creation of a private right of action for accused students would 
influence schools to act in the shadow of the law.  This would likely compel 
schools to conduct fairer investigations and adjudications of sexual assault 
to minimize litigation from wrongfully sanctioned students.  Money is 
already a motivating force of college adjudicative processes.313  The rush to 
find students responsible for sexual assault when they are accused can be 
attributed in part to the OCR’s threat to withhold the school’s funding for 
noncompliance with Title IX.314  Further, colleges currently face a greater 
litigation threat from students who believe their sexual assault accusations 
were not adequately handled.315  This incentivizes schools to hold accused 
students accountable quickly to stymie the threat of litigation costs from 
their accusers.316  If schools faced a comparable prospect of litigation from 
the wrongly accused, fairer and more meaningful sexual assault 
investigations and adjudications on campus will likely result. 
Of course, judicial scrutiny of every campus tribunal decision raises 
concerns of judicial economy.  It is untenable to expect courts to play such 
an active role in reviewing school disciplinary decisions.  Consequently, 
additional protection for the accused is a necessary component of any 
reform legislation.  If meaningful protections for the accused such as those 
proposed in this Note become standard across college campuses, the need 
for frequent judicial review likely will be diminished.  Meanwhile, courts 
should play the necessary role in preventing schools from overstepping 
their boundaries by expelling or suspending students without minimal due 
process. 
 
 309. Fair Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3408, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Safe Campus Act of 
2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); see supra Part I.C.2. 
 310. H.R. 3408 § 2; H.R. 3403 § 2. 
 311. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra Part II.A. 
 313. See supra notes 138–41, 269, 276 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 138–39, 269, 276 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Additional Due Process Protections 
Congress should enact legislation requiring both public and private 
institutions’ disciplinary proceedings to include provisions that protect the 
due process rights of accused students.  As discussed above, courts have 
primarily noted discontent with school adjudications that (1)  did not 
provide sufficient notice of the charges to the accused or provide adequate 
opportunity to review and refute all material evidence, (2)  used a Title IX 
office that played multiple roles during the proceedings, (3)  consisted of an 
unfair and impartial hearing, (4)  lacked equal access to representation, and 
(5)  denied students adequate opportunity to confront adverse witnesses.  
This section advocates for enactment of legislation with provisions 
addressing each of these concerns, drawing from the proposed provisions in 
the Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act.  This Note does not take 
issue with the provisions in CASA that aim to provide additional protection 
for the accusers, but not without substantial additional protection for the 
accused.317 
1.  Sufficient Notice and Material Evidence 
First, Congress should require schools to provide accused students with 
sufficient notice and the opportunity to view the complaint and all material 
evidence.  As discussed above, courts in both the due process and Title IX 
contexts have found that insufficient notice is a due process violation and is 
fundamentally unfair to the accused.  The court in Tanyi v. Appalachian 
State University318 found that less than twenty-four-hour notice was 
insufficient.319  In the Title IX context, the courts in Doe v. University of 
South320 and Yu found that one-day notice was sufficient.321  Congress 
should adopt legislation that requires schools to notify students of the 
charges against them at least twenty-four hours prior to the start of 
adjudicatory proceedings. 
The Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act propose that schools 
provide parties with written notice “not later than 2 weeks prior to the start 
of any formal hearing or similar adjudicatory proceeding.”322  CASA 
provides that written notice be given to parties within twenty-four hours.323  
Regardless of the timeframe, Congress should enact legislation that 
provides the accused the right to see the complaint, as this is an essential 
tenet of due process.324 
 
 317. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 318. No. 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853 (W.D.N.C. July 22, 2015). 
 319. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 320. 687 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). 
 321. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 322. Fair Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3408, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Safe Campus Act of 
2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
 323. Campus Accountability and Safety Act, S. 590, 114th Cong. (2015); see also supra 
Part I.C.1. 
 324. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
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Second, Congress should adopt legislation that provides the accused with 
the chance to adequately review and refute material evidence.  The absence 
of such an opportunity in Regents of the University of California San Diego, 
University of Massachusetts-Amherst, and Salisbury contributed to the 
courts’ findings that the disciplinary proceedings were fundamentally unfair 
and procedurally flawed.325  Accordingly, schools should provide students 
with an adequate and meaningful opportunity to review and refute evidence, 
such as witness statements and investigator reports, prior to the initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings. 
The Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act provide that schools 
should “ensure that all parties to the proceeding have access to all material 
evidence . . . not later than one week prior to the start of any formal hearing 
or similar adjudicatory proceeding.”326  Congress should adopt such a 
provision.  Considering the seriousness of the outcome to both parties in 
these proceedings,327 the inability to review evidence is a “shocking 
deprivation of fair process.”328 
2.  The Role of Title IX Offices 
Congress should reform the role that Title IX coordinators play in 
campus proceedings.  Typically, Title IX coordinators play multiple roles, 
including “advis[ing] complainants how to file their complaints, receiv[ing] 
the complaints, conduct[ing] the investigation, hold[ing] the hearing if any, 
decid[ing] on responsibility, and hear[ing] any appeals,” which presents a 
conflict of interest problem.329  In the public-school context, the court in 
Regents of the University of California San Diego, implicitly acknowledged 
such a bias, finding that a panel’s reliance on the Title IX investigator’s 
report without the opportunity for the accused to refute it was 
fundamentally unfair.330  However, the use of a Title IX investigator to 
fulfill multiple roles was not evidence of a flawed proceeding in the Title 
IX context.331 
The Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act would require schools to 
“ensure that the proceeding is carried out free from conflicts of interest by 
ensuring that there is no commingling of administrative or adjudicative 
roles.”332  Such commingling includes the involvement of a single person in 
more than one of the following roles:  (1)  victim counselor and victim 
advocate; (2)  investigator; (3)  prosecutor; (4)  adjudicator; or (5)  appellate 
 
 325. See supra notes 171–73, 218–19 and accompanying text. 
 326. H.R. 3408 § 2; H.R. 3403 § 2; see also supra Part I.C.2. 
 327. See supra Part II.A. 
 328. Halley Statement, supra note 281, at 2; see also supra notes 277, 282–83 and 
accompanying text. 
 329. Halley Statement, supra note 281, at 2; see also supra notes 273, 279, 284 and 
accompanying text. 
 330. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 332. Fair Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3408, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Safe Campus Act of 
2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
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adjudicator.333  Congress should enact a provision similar to this one to 
eliminate the bias that Title IX offices, charged with prosecuting sexual 
assault on college campuses, pose in campus adjudications.  Title IX 
coordinators should be tasked with overseeing the process and ensuring 
fairness for both parties of the proceedings.  In fact, this is consistent with 
OCR’s guidance, which states that the Title IX coordinator should have 
“ultimate oversight responsibility” and should not have other roles that 
would “create a conflict of interest.”334 
3.  Fair Hearing 
Congress should require that schools provide students with a fair, 
impartial hearing for all sexual assault accusations.  The court in Sterrett v. 
Cowan335 found the denial of a hearing to be a due process violation.336  
Courts have also emphasized that failure to provide students the opportunity 
to present witnesses and the panel’s failure to consider evidence during the 
hearings is fundamentally unfair because “[d]ue process requires that a 
hearing . . . be a real one, not a sham or a pretense.”337 
The Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act do not explicitly require 
schools to conduct hearings, but rather that schools “provide each person 
against whom the allegation is made with a meaningful opportunity to 
admit or contest the allegation.”338  Considering courts’ reactions to 
adjudication of these allegations without a hearing, Congress should 
expressly require that schools conduct hearings prior to removing students 
from campus.  In the absence of a hearing, a student cannot meaningfully 
and adequately defend him or herself.339 
4.  Legal Representation 
Congress should enact legislation that requires schools to allow students 
representation during disciplinary proceedings.  In the due process and Title 
IX contexts, courts generally have not recognized an absolute right to 
attorney representation for students at school disciplinary proceedings.340  
Additionally, courts have not taken issue with a school’s denial of an 
advisors’ participation during a hearing.341  However, considering the 
significant consequences that accused students face as a result of these 
 
 333. H.R. 3408 § 2; H.R. 3403 § 2. 
 334. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 7. 
 335. 85 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Mich. 2015). 
 336. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 337. Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-
CTL, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015) (order granting petition for writ of mandamus), 
appeal docketed, No. D068901 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2015) (quoting Ciechon v. City of 
Chi., 686 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1982)); see also supra notes 175–78, 216–17, 219 and 
accompanying text. 
 338. H.R. 3408 § 2; H.R. 3403 § 2; see also supra Part I.C.2. 
 339. See supra notes 273, 277, 283 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 159, 210–13 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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hearings,342 students should be afforded the possibility of attorney 
representation or other advisors.  This attorney or advisor should similarly 
be allowed to take part in the proceeding because an important aspect of a 
fair hearing includes the right to confrontation of adverse witnesses, a role 
that a student’s advisor should play.343  Such a function heeds to caution of 
the “Dear Colleague” letter, which “strongly discourage[d] schools from 
allowing the parties personally to question or cross-examine each other 
during the hearing.”344 
The Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act provide that schools 
“shall permit each party to the proceeding to be represented, at the sole 
expense of the party, by an attorney or other advocate for the duration of the 
proceeding . . . and shall permit the attorney or other advocate to ask 
questions in the proceeding, file relevant papers, examine evidence, and 
examine witnesses.”345  Congress should enact such a provision.  Access to 
representation provides students facing serious, long-term consequences 
with an advocate to represent their interests.346  However, this raises 
concerns that such a provision may deny students equal representation 
because only those who can afford representation will employ it.347  Thus, 
to mitigate disparity, schools should ensure that all students have access to a 
legal or nonlegal advisor from the school. 
5.  Right to Confront 
Congress should require that schools allow cross-examination of adverse 
witnesses.  In many sexual assault cases, schools require that students 
submit questions to a hearing panel that selects which questions to pose to 
the accuser and witnesses.  In the Title IX context, this is an accepted 
procedure so long as the omitted questions do not materially affect the 
outcome of the proceeding.348  In the due process context, one court found 
this process to be improper where the panel omitted a significant number of 
questions and did not ask any follow-up questions.349  To avoid improper 
limitation of a student’s right to confrontation, advisors and advocates for 
each of the parties should be allowed to ask questions as long as the subject 
matter is limited to the contested sexual encounter and related events.350  
Although cross-examination can have a harmful emotional impact on 
 
 342. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 343. See infra Part III.B.5. 
 344. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 32, at 12. 
 345. Fair Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3408, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Safe Campus Act of 
2015, H.R. 3403, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); see also supra Part I.C.2. 
 346. See supra notes 130–31, 275, 278 and accompanying text. 
 347. See Tenerowicz, supra note 124; see also Berger & Berger, supra note 130, at 340. 
 348. See supra notes 220–23. 
 349. See supra notes 161–74 and accompanying text. 
 350. See Volokh, supra note 100 (“Rather than abolishing cross-examination, it would be 
much fairer to impose reasonable limits, including a ban on irrelevant questions regarding 
the sexual history and sexual orientation of the complainant; control over unfair, oppressive, 
or overbearing cross-examination; and even separation of the complainant and accused 
during the hearing.”). 
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accusers,351 many of these cases often rely on witness testimony and 
credibility, rendering confrontation an essential element to a fair hearing.352 
The Fair Campus Act and the Safe Campus Act provide that submission 
of questions to the hearing panel for cross-examination of the accuser is 
sufficient.353  However, in light of courts’ evaluation of this process, this 
responsibility should not lie with the members of the tribunal.  Accused 
students should be entitled to develop a defense that includes the 
opportunity to confront his or her accuser.  Without this possibility, the 
testimony of the accuser will remain virtually unchallenged, and additional 
students will be expelled or suspended at the hands of flawed proceedings. 
6.  The Standard of Proof:  Preponderance of the Evidence 
The “Dear Colleague” letter’s mandate that schools use a preponderance 
of the evidence standard of proof has provoked much debate.  Some have 
argued that it unfairly favors accusers, while others have argued that it 
appropriately balances the rights of the parties and that any departure from 
that standard would render it unfairly burdensome to prove that a sexual 
assault occurred, interfering with justice.354 
The cases discussed above reveal that courts have not taken much issue 
with the use of this evidentiary standard in campus disciplinary 
proceedings.355  Accordingly, coupled with the additional due process 
protections advocated for in this section, the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is an acceptable burden of proof for the adjudication of sexual 
assault claims on college campuses.  Without additional protections, 
however, such a low burden of proof would be inadequate because it would 
tip the scale in favor of accusers.356 
CONCLUSION 
The attempts of colleges to reform their policies to curb sexual assault 
and to avoid loss of funding for Title IX noncompliance has created a 
hostile environment for accused students.  While sexual assault on college 
campuses is in need of further attention, schools have tilted the scales too 
far in favor of accusers, thereby seriously threatening the rights and futures 
of wrongfully accused students.  “The days when institutions of higher 
education could use slipshod procedures to address complaints of campus 
sexual misconduct are, thankfully, over.”357  However, “The window of 
opportunity to install just and effective processes in their place remains 
open.”358  Procedures that adequately balance the interests and due process 
 
 351. See supra notes 124, 132, 288 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 168–70, 274, 277 and accompanying text. 
 353. Fair Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3408, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Safe Campus Act of 
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 354. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 224–28 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 357. Halley Statement, supra note 281, at 2. 
 358. Id. 
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rights of both accusers and the accused are the only way to preserve the 
academic environment and effectively curb the prevalence of sexual assault 
on college campuses.  The opportunity for interim judicial review and 
additional due process protections are necessary to strike this balance. 
